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EDITOR'S NOTE 
George R. Allen of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute 1 
University of Oxford 1 England I prepared this report at the invitation of the 
Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment. 
In connection with his stay in the United States in 1960 and 1961, 
Mr. Allen came to Iowa State University at the request of the Center. He 
served as a visiting professor for approximately six weeks during autumn 1 
1961. 
The observations and recommendations presented in this report are 1 
of course, those of the author, and represent one point of view concerning 
the most practical way to bring agricultural supply and demand into balance. 
However, the author's unique position should be noted. Mr. Allen 
is exceptionally well informed about American agriculture 1 yet unencumbered 
by vested interest in American economic theories or practices. He is in 
an objective position to point out the shortcomings of the present as well as 
the accomplishments of the past and possibilities of the future. His observa-
tions and recommendations deserve wide discussion and careful considera-
tion by all persons interested in finding solutions to today' s problems within 
the value system of the free world. They are of specific relevance to our 
foreign aid program and the cold war. 
Perhaps at this point it is appropriate to note that the larger objective 
of the Center includes helping both rural and urban people understand and 
shape the necessary social and economic adjustments in our growing society. 
Thus the Center gathers factual information to explain the magnitude and 
nature of the agricultural adjustment problems and public policy alternatives 
that can be used to solve the problems. It helps carry this information through 
educational channels to the people concerned so they will 11ave a basis on 
which to make intelligent decisions regarding agricultural adjustment and 
agricultural policy. 
This report has been published in line with this larger objective. 
The Editor 
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AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
I 
1. Research or Advanced Study---Land-grant colleges tend to devote 
most of their resources in the social sciences to research on primary data, 
usually with reference to internal United States problems and frequently on 
narrowly-defined subjects. They do this rather than emphasize advanced 
study (appraisal and synthesis of secondary information, i.e. , research 
studies) with the object of getting a wider view of related problems and 
policies in the economic and social fields. 
In the long run, advanced study, as defined, obviously presupposes 
a large amount of research, as defined. Yet, in relation to the world's 
problems, especially those in underdeveloped countries, there is an im-
mediate and urgent need for a large number of university staff economists 
whose principal commitment should be, over the wide range of agricultural 
and agrarian policies, to assimilate a large body of secondary information, 
to synthesize from it, and to disseminate the results both on and off campus. 
Perhaps only five percent of resources within agricultural economics 
and related fields should be redirected to achieve the envisaged benefits. 
Yet this shift underscores a strong plea for more generalists and less 
specialists. 
2. The Role and Status of the Teacher--To create an academic climate 
suitable for generalists and to garner the fruits of their work presupposes 
a re-appraisal of the status of teaching, .per se, in the land-grant colleges. 
Conversations with academic people in many colleges and the writer's own 
limited experience indicate that success in teaching is valued much less 
than success in research. "Publish or perish" is a reasonable rule if an 
individual's teaching commitment is to be within a narrow field. In that 
case stimulating teaching will generally presuppose successful and continued 
research on primary data. 
But if it is granted that there is a need for more generalists, then for 
them research on the one hand and teaching and advanced study on the other, 
at least if simultaneously pursued, become competitive and not complemen~ 
tary. Working on primary data and writing up the results consume time and 
energy and mitigate against teaching in a successful, integrated way over 
a wide range of topics. There is an extremely important role to be played 
by the academic who is primarily a teacher with wide interests, who keeps 
most of J1is time for advanced study (as defined above) and who relies 
principally upon the spoken word to disseminate his understanding. 
3. Extension Work and Adult Education--In line with the last two 
recommendations there is an extremely strong case for strengthening the 
efforts already being made in several land-grant colleges (Arkansas, Iowa, 
Pennsylvania and New York) to widen the scope of extension work by 
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providing basic material and guidance for farm community groups to discuss 
the more general problems bearing on local and state government and 
administration. In the process, extension work becomes adult education 
in the social sciences. A further need is to widen the terms of reference to 
take in the rest of the world and the United States' international policies. 
4. Organization--The proposals made above generally do not involve 
any major changes in organization with the land-grant colleges which are 
unlikely to be self-evident. Presumably the main problem would be in 
judging the teacher, whose attainments obviously must be less tangible 
than those of a researcher. 
One specific organizational proposal, it is hoped, would be favorably 
considered. Closer formal links should be established by the land:-grant 
colleges with European universities having strong departments of agricultural 
economics. Apart from the reciprocal benefits for Europe, this arrangement 
would aid the United States. European academic traditions could be of 
great assistance in securing the new emphasis suggested above. In 
addition, such contacts would facilitate the more extensive tapping of the 
large amounts of expertise on underdeveloped countries which, by virtue 
of past imperial connections, exist in many European countries, including 
their Jlniversities. This, of course, is a wasting asset, but it is still 
substantial. 
One specific way of fostering the proposed intercourse might be for 
inter-university agreements which would enable American postgraduate 
students to count work at European universities as part of their required 
course work for a Ph. D. at an American university. Formal arrangement 
would be required because of the need for an American student seeking an 
academic career to possess a Ph.D. Or again, some projects now being 
planned bilaterally between individual American universities and institutions 
in underdeveloped countries might be developed on a tri-partite basis to 
include particular European universities as third partners. 
5. Important Topics in Advanced Study and Research--In view of the 
considerable economic element in present international tensions, certain 
subjects claim top priority. In advanced study a crash program is needed, 
especially for underdeveloped countries, above all for land, credit and 
marketing problems. In research a top priority is a thorough appraisal 
within a realistic set of political assumptions of the case for a greatly 
e}(tended "Food for Peace" program, e~pecially one which covers the whole 
Atlantic Community. In the longer run, the welfare economics of urban and 
rural geographic patterns of development seems important. 
6. Political Science in the Study of Agricultural and Agrarian Mfairs--
The need today is for a political economy, rather than an economics, of 
agriculture and rural communities. To this end there should be much more 
scope for work by political scientists in the social studies work of the 
land-grant colleges, and they should work closely with economists. 
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PREFACE 
Reading through this study, I realize that it may give a total impression 
which is unintended. Criticism is added to criticism that by the end a reader 
might ask whether I have simply indulged in an ever-present inclination among 
the British, presumably a hangover from 17 76, to find fault with the United 
States, taking in my case, among other forms, an attempt to devalue the great 
pioneering advances in mathematical economics and econometrics which have 
come from American economists and agricultural economists in the last two 
decades. 
This has not been my conscious intention; nor 1 I hope, a sub-
conscious one. Such would be a poor recompense for the many kindnesses 
shown to me during the year I spent in the United States in 1960 and 1961, 
for the initial invitation of, and, of the long stay at the Department of 
Agricultural Economics of the University of California 1 for the subsequent 
invitation from the Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment at Ames 
which prolonged my sojourn and widened my experience, for the considerable 
time which colleagues from many land-grant colleges have given to answering 
my questions on various occasions, and for the assistance of the Fulbright 
Commission throughout the year. 
I have concentrated on important defects, as I see them I of the land-
grant colleges and I have tried to state my case vigorously. Such an 
approach seems to be demanded by the international economic and political 
crisis of our times. If I were writing about British, or more generally 
European 1 agricultural economics and related studies, I would follow the 
same approach for the same reason, although the suggested deficiencies 
would mostly be different from those discussed here and would be emphasized, 
in large measure, by highlighting such achievements of the land-grant colleges 
as the combination of economics and technology to produce authoritative 
experts to a degree not found in Europe (especially in marketing), and their 
progress in econometrics and in mathematical economics. 
In our continuing discussions in the West and across the Atlantic to 
make our universities better equipped to provide the well informed basis of 
public opinion which is necessary if we are to survive the Cold War and the 
Nuclear Terror and if we are to become prepared and able to give more 
effective economic aid and guidance to the materially poorer regions of the 
world 1 we cannot afford to bask in the record of our achievements. Let us 
rather concentrate on seeking out our limitations and removing them, always 
taking care that in the process the many worthwhile and continuing products 
of our past efforts are not destroyed or weakened. 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 
Parks Road, 
Oxford, England 
ix 
George R. Allen 
December 1961. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The land-grant institutions of the United States are almost unique 
among the facilities for higher education ana research relating to agriculture 
in the western world and in other countries. They have brought the natural 
sciences to bear on the technical problems of agriculture at least as effec-
tively as have the various agricultural colleges and agricultural departments 
of universities in other western countries. But their special contribution, on 
average not matched elsewhere, has been to make the social sciences mean-
ingful in the production, marketing and distribution of food and fibers. This 
marriage of the natural and social sciences, with a high standard of econom-
ics at the core, has played an extremely important role in the exceptional 
agricultural progress of the United States, to a large measure as a result of 
close association of academic workers with an agricultural extension service 
which both in range and depth of its activities cannot be matched by other 
countries and which is part of the land-grant system. The record of their 
own achievement is, by itself, one of the most important pieces of instruc-
tion that land-grant institutions can bring to the rest of the world, especially 
to the underdeveloped countries where agriculture is too frequently despised 
by those who have received a high school or university education. 
Yet radical changes seem to be needed in the orientation and programs 
of the land-grant colleges. First, the major problems of United States agri-
culture have changed and are no longer those simply of maximizing technical 
progress in the industry. With the sustained and generally severe pressure 
on farm incomes, as demand for most farm products has tended to grow less 
rapidly than supply, there has come recognition that the colleges must look 
beyond the needs of enabling American farmers to become technical! y more 
efficient or even beyond the opportunities for securing more economical 
systems of marketing. The research, teaching and extension activities of 
the land-grant colleges must be enlarged to show how agriculture might adjust 
itself within the changing American economy - for example by developing new 
markets, even if they be subsidized, by limiting supply or by finding means to 
enable more farmers to find alternative and more remunerative work. Such is 
the philosophy underlining the work and publications of the Center for Agri-
cultural and Economic Adjustment. 
Another need remains. What should land-grant colleges do to help a 
world which, under many and growing economic political tensions, is in the 
process of rapid and often violent change and revolution and which, many 
would feel, is almost at the end of its tether and of its ability to retain the 
minimum of order to secure the continuance of life on this planet? 
Stated in these terms, the question might seem outside the competence 
or academic obligation of a land-grant college economist to his society, at 
least in his professional career. This is not so. First, many of the world's 
problems today are clearly the consequences of agricultures which are 
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performing unsatisfactorily in underdeveloped countries or of international 
agricultural trade policies which often depress the economic welfare of poorer 
countries; and they could be lessened, as we shall see, by changes in em-
phasis in the agricultural policies of the rich countries. 
Second, in their commitments to assist rural communities to make 
rational decisions concerning their well-being, the economists and political 
scientists in land-grant colleges are well qualified to set before rural people 
the relevant material on the biggest issue facing them all - the economic and 
social requirements for a peaceful world. It is surely much more relevant to-
day to explain to rural (and urban) peoples in the United States, and in many 
other counttfes for that matter, the possible political and economic implica- 1 
tions of, for example, different levels of economic aid to India or of the 
alternative benefits from extending aid to underdeveloped countti'es and from 
equivalent expenditure on space travel than it is to indicate whether or not 
an individual farmer should add more fertilizer to his crop. One might ask 
these questions of those who argue otherwise: how else is an open society 
to face the complex problems of the world today? Who else should be better 
equipped to set out the facts than the academic economist or policical 
scientist, and , in addition, to provide fruitful interpretations of the facts? 
In making these claims, I am cons.cious of reflecting an academic 
tradition somewhat different from that of the land-grant colleges. There is a 
greater willingness among British social scientists to engage in presenting 
issues or in advocating conclusions with direct political implications than is 
generally found among their land-grant college colleagues 1 . No one can deny 
that the latter's avoidance or minimization of involvement, even indirectly, 
in issues which are politically controversial has greatly assisted in building 
the public reputation of the colleges among the peop~e they desire to serve2 . 
Moreover, one cannot deny that in the last resort the extent of academic 
freedom is decided not by university workers, but by.the public's attitude. 
Detailed consideration of many of the is sues set out in this monograph carries 
the risk of leading to serious public misunderstanding concerning the · 
1 With the possible major exception of Germany, the traditions in most parts 
of Western Europe are similar to those in Britain. The gains are not entire-
ly one-sided. As will be argued later, there is probably insufficient 
specialization, from a purely academic point of view, w'ithin a particular 
discipline such as economics in some British universities in contrast with, 
in the writer's opinion, excessive specialization in the United States. The 
British bias is_pattlythe consequence of the greater political involvement. 
2 A good example is provided by the V!igorous defense by Iowa newspapers, 
especially by the Des Moines Register, of Iowa State University economists 
whose work had come under attack by the Farm Bureau early in 1960. 
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independence and objectivity, as far as anyone ever can be objective on 
important political issues, of social scientists in the land-grant colleges. 
In such circumstances loss of good will might also damage the opportunities 
for natural scientists working there. 
But these risks cannot be avoided in the present times of crisis. The 
population explosion in Asia, the agrarian and urban unrest of Latin America, 
the political emergence of Mrica and the Russian man orbiting the earth leave 
us no choice. And time is running out - fast. 3 In the Dark Ages, it is re':" 
ported, educated men retired to the monasteries to follow the contemplative 
life because the world outside was too horrible. We must not act in an 
equivalent way today by concentrating all or too much of our research and 
teaching energies on economic and social issues of secondary political 
significance. Yet there are many temptations to do this, especially the 
intellectual attractions of the many pioneering developments in new methods 
of aggregative and quantitative economic analysis, or of many, but not all, 
theoretical refinements which offer little prospects of speeding empirical 
advance to an already well worked-out body of general economic analytical 
principles. 
3 From a related point of view, Professor Lawrence Witt has recommended 
that agricultural economists play more part in forming public opinion. "We 
should stress the importance of value formulation as a vital contribution 
of our work. We cannot expect the general population to urge upon Con-
gress the importance and validity of certain values which Americans have 
respecting other peoples, unless we, ourselves, as professional social 
scientists give a part of our effort to the study of values in the interrela-
tionships of foreign and domestic policy. If you believe, as I do, that the 
lack of .a positive foreign policy. is a major criticism of America's world 
position, then the creation and advocating of such a program is fundamental. 
Against the alternative of thermonuclear war, or even the threat of it, any 
economic development effort is small change. Surely when the history of 
the 1960's is written (assuming there is someone to write it), it should not 
be said that the trained minds stood aside when these human values should 
have been discussed. " Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, 
Report No. 2, Demand for Farm Products, page 61 
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THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC SETTING 
In her book, India and the West, Barbara Ward mentions the plight 
and discontent of the large number of educated young Indians who are unable 
at the present time to find profitable employment in their country. She 
refers to them again in discussing the ideological conflict between the West 
and the Communists. 
"At present, a Western student involved perhaps on a joint 
work project with Indian students from the troubled universities 
of Calcutta or Lucknow cannot explain coherently what the West 
really intends. He cannot say that Western governments are 
finally committed to positive, long-term economic aid aimed 
simply at bringing the rest of the world level with the devel-
oped lands. He cannot explain, with missionary fervor, how 
his nation 1 s domestic principles of justice and solidarity must 
now be made world-wide. He cannot say that the deepest tra-
ditions and highest aspirations of the West are involved in the 
great task of world reconstruction. He cannot boast that he 
and his sons and his sons 1 sons will be engaged in the task un-
til a modest affluence in bread and work and shelter is the lot 
of all mankind. He cannot, therefore, even begin to talk of 
the value and advantage of free institutions; for, as an Amert-
can extremist once remarked, in these days 1 the rich want 
liberty but the poor want ham and eggs. 1 So he loses out in 
the argument to the well-trained young fellow from Moscow who 
genuinely believes himself engaged on a crusade for all man-
kind, and who attacks the Western student for belonging to a 
society which puts profits first, exploits the world, grows 
richer while the rest grow poorer, and does nothing to lessen 
the gap - save perhaps when a Communist scare leads to some 
improvised and half-baked activity. " (India and the West, 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1961. p. 242) 
Another writer, J. K. Galbraith, now United States Ambassador in 
India, presents another problem for the United States in an essay, "The 
Strategy of Peaceful Competition, " in his recent book, The Liberal Hour. 
"Above all, we must not assume that because the Soviets 
have a planned society and we, in general, do not, our rules 
preclude a planned response to Soviet initiatives. There is 
a dangerous tendency to imagine that faith in a free society 
means faith that it will accomplish everything that is need-
ful without effort or direction. Or at most, incantation is 
all that is required. The affect of such a doctrine - a ruling 
doctrine in recent years - is to exclude an effective response 
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to Soviet competition on grounds of principle. It means that we must 
fail because to succeed would be in violation of our ideology. For, in 
fact, most of the things which effective competition requires will also 
require~ effective government leadership. There is no alternative. " 
(The Uberal Hour, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960. p. 17) 
Stated simply, these quotations pose the two critical issues for the 
West in its relations with the peoples of underdeveloped parts of the world. 
{1) Does it really care about their plight and do they believe we care? 
(2) Does the West, above all the United States, really understand their 
plans for development and why these often take a form at least super-
ficially different from those which the West itself has been able to 
pursue successfully in the century or more of economic development? 
The second question is directed more at the United States than at 
Western Europe because European thinking and experience.: testify to a 
greater readiness to accept a positive and extensive role for government and 
public enterprise than. is the case in the United States. 
Do We Care? 
Does the West really care? To many people in Western Europe or in 
North America sincerely concerned about the :lilgl'llt: against poverty in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America this question will come as a shock, perhaps a severe 
shock. After all, large sums of money have been provided to aid underdevel- · 
oped countries by the United States since the end of the war and, in more 
recent years, by Western Europe as well. United States aid to India is about 
six times that of the U.S.S.R. The West as a whole, excluding short-term 
and long-term capital loans made to underdeveloped countries in response 
to ordinary profit incentives, has in recent years provided economic aid of 
various kinds in value many times that provided by the U.S.S.R. and Communist 
China. In addition, loans made through normal commercial channels, especi-
ally long-term loans, even though much of their benefit has accrued directly 
to the richer countries, have done much to aid economic development, 
especially as the oil producing countries in recent years have been able to 
secure larger royalties from the industry. 4 
4 The United Kingdom, for example, has lent large amounts of capital, often 
with serious short-term consequences for its balance of payments. Indeed, 
in recent years there has been a lively controversy concerning the extent of 
this foreigh lending; many critics have argued that it should be curtailed by 
government control. Ironically enough, many of the vocal oponents of 
Britain's present role as a long-term lender are economists who in other 
respects strongly advocate increased aid to underdeveloped countries. 
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How do the aid programs of the West and the Communist countries 
compare? There is, in the first place I disagreement on what should be 
counted as aid. It can be argued that the normal commercial capital flows 
from the West should be ignored. For example those going to oil fields and 
plantations, because they directly add to the economic well-being of the 
West as much as they assist underdeveloped countries: These loans are 
inspired by self-interest and we cannot, therefore, claim them as a measure 
of our generosity. The underdeveloped world, generally speaking, will give 
us no credit in the Cold War for these loans, especially as they are still 
sometimes feared as involving the risk of continuing colonialism in an in-· 
direct form. 
We should count as aid grants or loans which do not directly benefit 
the Western economics and which would not have been made available if 
they had been required to pass the conventional tests of economic profit-
ability. Even with this definition 1 there is great difficulty in reconciling 
the various sets of statistics available. One of the great problems is that the 
amounts allocated as available for aid within a specific period are not 
always used during that time. 
The following summary provides an approximate estimate of the aid 
which, as defined above, was used in 1959-60. 5 
Table 1 . Value of Aid to Underdeveloped Countries, 1959-60 
U.S.A. (Billion dollars) 
• 7 Development Loan Fund 
Export-Import Bank (net loans) 
Food surpluses under P. L. 480 
(nominal sale value) 
Technical Assistance 
Emergency Fund 
. 3 
• 9 
• 2 
• 2 
2.3 
Others 
5 
U.K. ( 
France) Public grants and loans ( 
Others) ( 
Technical Assistance (Including from U.N.) 
• 2 
. 5 
.1 
• 2 
1.0 
There statistics are drawn from P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International 
Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, May, 1961. The new Alliance for Progress between the United 
States and Latin America will add substantially to western aid. Two 
billion dollars annually is to b~ provided, $1. 1 billion from the U.S. 
government and the rest from other sources. But this will apparently in-
clude current aid so that the net increase will be much less than $2 bil-
lion. 
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In all, the West provided aid in 1959 and 1960 to a value of 3. 3 billion 
dollars. During the same period, Russian grants and loans used (as distinct 
from those granted) amounted to 0. 5 billion dollars. The amounts of annual 
aid ear-marked by the Russians are much larger than this sum and appear to 
be growing rapid! y. 
But in the underdeveloped countdes the parable of the widow's mite 
has a strong appeal. Russia is known to be much poorer than the West. 
The following statistics provide a rough measure of the differences in wealth 
of the West and the U.S.S.R. and, therefore, in capacities to aid poor 
countries. Broadly speaking, the West has provided annually in recent years 
aid equivalent to less than one-third of one percent ·of its gross natural 
product -. not much. 
Table 2. Populations and G. N. P. 's in Various Regions of the World 
Percentage 
Percentage ""'of World Total GNP 
. of World Total GNP in Real Terms 
Population Ih' Real Terms (Billion dollars) · 
U.S.A. 6.2 29 ."4. 515 
Western Europe 8,7 22.0 385 
U.S.S.R. 7.2 12 . 1 212 
South and Central America 7.0 5. 1 89 
Noncommunist Aisa -
Excluding Japan 26.1 6.8 120 
Africa - Excluding South 
Africa 6.9 1.9 34 
Source: P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped 
Countries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1961. 
- --
Note: These statistics provide only rough orders of magnitude, 
especially in view of the great difficulties in making inter-
national comparisons of the value of money. 
The West is thought, with a considerable element of truth, to have 
been lucky in having favorable environmental factors to assist its economic 
development and to have built up its vast wealth partly at the expense of the 
poorer countries of the world. For example, European or American traders 
are often considered to have used the'ir bargaining power unfairly and colonial 
governments to have obtained much more from their colonies .than they pro-
vided to them. 6 The United Fruit Company, to cite but one case, is still 
often regarded as the ~'Emp'ire in Green and Gold. 11 
These economic criticisms are often emeshed with and exaggerated by the 
clashes of cultures which followed in the wake of Western commercial 
endeavors. The disruptive effects of contact with the commerce of the West 
on 19th century Chinese society are well known. They led to a smouldering 
resentment of western countries long before Communist influence added even 
stronger stimulants to anti-western feeling. 
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Then I with its particular strategic advantage from having a centrally 
planned and authoritarian society 1 the U.S.S.R. has so far been able to 
apply its foreign aid in locations and forms most calculated to be noticed 
and to appeal to underdeveloped countries. For example 1 U.S.S.R. initiated 
the practice of providing complete steel mills in India. Britain and Germany 
followed suit much later and I especially as far as the German arrangement 
was concerned 1 on much less favorable terms. 7 
Thus many of the articulate members .of underdeveloped societies are 
not overimpressed by the extent of aid which the West has provided to 
them. Perhaps they are justified and would be entitled in directing at us 
the admonition found in Shakespeare's King Lear. 
7 
Take physic, Pomp, 
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel; 
That thou may' st shake the superflux to them, 
And show the heavens more just. 
King Lear, Act III, scene iv 
On Russian aid, the United States Department of State comments as 
follows: 
"On the whole, it would appear that the aid of the Communist Bloc 
countries has been negotiated and administered with skill, speed, 
and sensitivity. There seems to be a growing receptivity to aid 
from the Communist Bloc even among countries close to the United 
States ... The increasing influence of Communist Bloc aid is felt in 
key economic sectors of some countries: in the close trade ties 
established with the Bloc under the aid agreements, in the presence 
of Communist advisers in important ministeries, and in a tendency in 
some quarters to look to the Communist experience as a model for 
economic development . . . The aid projects themselves have 
usually been addressed to important sectors of the economy and often 
executed in full by Bloc personnel with provision for training of local 
personnel to replace them. Usually there have been no detailed 
requirements for the economic justification of individual projects. 
These have been selected because of their political-economic 
impact and the high priority given to them by the recipient country . 
It can be assumed, however, that the bloc countries will encounter 
some of the same nationalistic, neutralist, and bureaucratic sentiments 
and difficulties the United States has met, but so far these have not 
been a major problem." An Act for International Development, a 
Summary Presentation, June 19 61, Department of State, United States 
of America, pp. 185-87 
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By any reasonable standard for discussion -whether it be humanitarian 
appeal or the widely-agreed social and political objectives which the West 
wishes to achieve through the world - our aid programs are too small. The 
greatest democratic experiment in raising living standards from subsistence 
levels - in India - is almost at the breaking point. If it fails, it will surely 
give wayto the totalitarian path to greater economic growth. In many parts 
of the world, real income per head is stagnant or falling in the face of in-
creasing population pressure; elsewhere it is not rising fast enough to 
enable politically conscious, active and powerful groups, such as the 
urban proletariat to escape quickly enough from the appallingly low standards 
which have been their lot on earth and which they are no longer content to 
tolerate. 
And, if the West would provide aid on a much larger scale than now, 
many actions and emotions harming progress in underdeveloped countries, 
which will be discussed later, 8 would fall into better perspective. 
Barbara Ward, in following up her previously quoted statement, states the 
issue clearly. 
11 But if patiently, doggedly, co-operatively, undeterred by 
difficulties and setbacks, unconcerned by criticism and misunder-
standing, the Western Powers set themselves to create the agencies 
of joint work for world development, and if they financed them 
adequately for the enormous task, the young Western student would 
no longer be unable to give a reason for the faith that is in him. 
His argument would be action, his proof the facts. And the process 
of disproving the Marxist myth - a process which began with the 
first Factory Act and the first shilling in the income tax - would 
have been completed by replacing the picture of imperialist 
exploitation with the reality of worldwide economic aid. 11 (India 
and the West, pp. 242-43) 
Our task of doing what we can to enable underdeveloped countries to 
make better use of their resources than they riow do would be much easier 
if we were confident that we could show that the West has a burning, 
missionary zeal to raise living standards where now poverty is a common:-
place, For example, in this paper many remarks will be made criticizing 
policies being followed in underdeveloped· countries. But it is a distinctly 
uncomfortable task in levelirg criticisms at underdeveloped countries on 
the grounds that their programs often damage their own economic prospects 
when one considers that they regard the West as a whole as somewhat, 
if not almost completely, indifferent to their plight, except in relation to the 
Cold War - and when one shares that feeling. 
8 Such as the colonial exploitation thesis and the resulting, often costly 
economic nationalisms. 
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The overriding need in land-grant colleges today, as in other academic 
institutions, is to stimulate discussion and indicate the implications of 
current aid programs of the West and the Communist Bloc. We should not 
regret the aid which underdeveloped countries can obtain from Communist 
sources. Discussion and analysis of our own programs will show how, by 
much greater economic assistance, strategically applied, we can tum this 
Communist support to the general purpose of creating economically progres-
sive and open, liberal societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 9 
This task of analysis, discussion and dissemination is not as simple 
an assignment as it may seem. Certainly a massive, crude and emotionally 
highly-charged campaign of propaganda is not proposed. Disscussing the in-
adequacies of our aid programs does not simply involve saying more aid is 
needed nor indicating, as far as the land-grant colleges are concerned, 
that extended aid will directly or indirectly increase the market for farm 
products from the United States. The process of education, information and 
persuasion is more complicated. It should, for example, include the 
following. 
First, there is the mechanics of "take off" - explaining how capital 
accumulation of both human and material resources and population growth 
interact to prevent or enable a country to achieve sustained growth. It is 
important to indicate how a successful aid program may require large 
quantities of assistance in the early years in order to permit "an economic 
breakthrough." Without a ''breakthrough, " aid on a continuing basis can 
simp! y be the throwing of good money after bad. 
Second, much effort will be needed to establish relationships between 
economic programs of growth and institutions conducive to the building up 
of democratic societies in underdeveloped countries. Do people in the 
United States appreciate the extent to which underdeveloped countries, 
anxious to achieve and maintain free societies, but with limited resources, 
feel the need in the course of their development to adopt measures of govern-
mental intervention not generally acceptable in the United States? One must 
explore to what extent the initial material, political and social conditions 
in underdeveloped countries seeking growth permit an institutionally- organ-
ized program of growth similar to those followed in the United States or the 
United Kingdom during their century and a half of economic progress before, 
say, 1930. 10 It may be necessary to bring in a political scientist to 
9 For example, if it were considered that the Russian-type concentration on 
heavy industries and neglect of agriculture is undesirable in countries such 
as India. The Western aid could be directed so as to offset the development 
tendencies promoted by Communist grants and loans. 
l 0 Popular feelings in the United States as to what constitute appropriate 
development policies appear to draw instinctively more on the experience 
of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century than 
on that of the years of the New Deal and later,when the government has 
intervened more extensively in the economy. 
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help rural peoples decide to what extent different institutional approaches, 
such as the considerable degree of state intervention in India, are consistent 
with the goal of achieving societies which, allowing for the different cultural 
backgrounds and attitudes of their peoples, are equivalent to the decentralized 
liberal society outlined in the American constitution. 
Third, there are many possible effects on the American economy to be 
considered. For example the effect on the balance of payments or on the 
relative income positions of different social groups. 
But, the, main problem is to make known the extent of poverty in the 
world and its many direct and serious implications for the future well-being 
of people of both rich and poor countries. 
Do We Understand? 
A recent Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service 
extension sheet states: "We do not feel compelled to remake the world in 
our im~ge. ,ll Yet large numbers of Americans seem to be perplexed or 
disturbed when they see other societies outside the Communist orbit 
actually or apparently adopting P·oliti'cal ; systems and .economic 
measures radically different from their own: Military governments 
replace '(usuaJly inefficient ·or corrupt) democracies. . Governments 
pledged to maintain democratic institutions prefer to work for communal-
type farms rather than family farms, or keep the development of large parts 
of the manufacturing industry sector under their own direct control. 
Private enterprise merchants in the agricultural sector are penalized so that 
cooperatives, often highly subsidized and sponsored by the state but not 
springing directly from the initiative of the farmers, may handle the trade 
in farm requisites and output. Manufacturing industries are subsidized or 
are protected from foreign competition by tariffs or by severe licensing of 
imports. Countries turn to heavy and highly inflationary deficit financing 
to meet their public expenditures, including large investment outlays. 
Countries ask for foreign aid; yet at the same time, they are still often 
suspicious of American or European entrepreneurs who want to establish 
private businesses within their frontiers. 
In part, but only in part, there would be fewer such perplexities or 
misgivings if it were recognized that the United States -- and other recog-
nizably friendly and democratic countries - pursue somewhat similar national 
and international policies. For example, the United States has had heavy 
tariffs on manufactured goods for decades. Again, Puerto Rico has its 
successful proportionate profit farms, which correspond much more to 
11 TheiowaFutureSeries, FactSheet, No.1, p. 5 
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communal-type farming than to family farming. Almost all Western European 
countries 'have important nationalized sectors in manufacturing, transport 
and fuel industries., 
In part, a broader historical perspective would help to indicate that 
some of the present developments in some underdeveloped countries are 
not necessarily incompatible with the ultimate attainment of democratic 
standards, which are the political yardstick of the West. After all, our 
Western democracies are fairly -new. In two centuries the United States has 
developed from an oligarchical republic to a democratic republic and the 
United Kingdom from a monarchy _.supported by an oligarchy to a democratic mon-
archy, as universalsuffrage has been gradually attained in both countries. 
But there may be a much more important barrier to understanding and 
appraising what is happening in the underdeveloped world, namely the 
highly successful history of economic, social and political development 
which is the heritage of citizens of the United States today. This heritage 
seems to create difficulties in appreciating and appraising the reasons for 
some of the forms which the world revolution is taking. 
There were three unique factors in the experience of the United States. 
during the one hundred years before the New Deal. Only a few other 
countries have enjoyed a comparable experience -Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and to some extent South Africa and a few limited regions of 
South America. Unless these exceptional features are recognized, there 
will be a natural and widely held tendency to assume that United States 
institutions 1 methods of governmental organization, roles of government I ,and 
attitudes towards public policy 1 which generally have stood the test of experi-
ence well in the most important decades of economic growth, can be directly 
applied in many underdeveloped countries. 
First, perhaps to emphasize the obvious, the United States was in its 
formative years of the early colonies and of the movement westward in the 
19th century, built up by an immigrant people. In the nature of the case, 
voluntary international m~gration is highly selective towards the more 
efficient and energetic. 1 People became voluntary immigrants, even if 
pressed by poverty to move, because they had the vision to recognize 
potential opportunities, because they were prepared to take more than 
12 To some extent this might be true of the involuntary immigrants transported 
to Australia as convicted criminals in the 19th century. Often they were 
people who were forced by extreme poverty 1 not by innate criminality, to 
act in defiance of the repressive penal system of the time. The "Tolpuddle 
Martyrs" - sentenced and transported to Australia :in the 1820's for 
attempting to form an agricultural workers union in Dorsetshire - are the 
obvious example. But there must have been very many more. Not only 
defiance of harsh labor laws but acts of theft must have reflected as much 
a willingness to face great odds, including the death sentence, as a 
feeling of complete desperation. 
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average chances and, in many cases, :because they had been able to rise 
above the typical, very low standard of success in their old communities 
and to acquire the critical although minimal financial resources often 
required to meet the costs of migration or of resettlement. Moreover, 
whether in the 17th century or the 19th century, they came mostly from 
nations with considerable commercial and other entrepreneurial experience. 
These considerations and the S.timulus of a break from the past and 
from handicapping traditions mean that in the period under consideration 
the United States certainly had a population whose quality, from the point 
of view of economic development, was much above average. Social and 
economic progress did not depend upon the initiative of a few, upon a 
revolution imposed from above. The "grass roots" were vigorous; progress 
could spring from them. 
Second, these immigrants came to a continent much richer in resources 
relative to"'tts existing populatiom'than most other parts of the world. The 
new continent had an agricultural potential well suited for development by 
pioneeriqg family farms. It was not already socially and economically 
organized on the basis of institutions and traditions unfavorable to economic 
progress. Given these opportunities, the lack of constraining traditions 
and the exceptional energy of the American people, it was possible to 
envisage and achieve satisfactory economic development based on minimum 
government intervention and maximum private responsibility, especially as 
far as agriculture was concerned. 
Later in agriculture, as in other sectors of the economy, the process 
of economic development demanded greater government action. Settlement 
took place increasingly in more arid zones needing large irrigation systems. 
Specialized crops began to be developed regionally, requiring more complex 
marketing organizations than individual producers or small groups of producers 
could achieve. 13 Government intervention became necessary to support 
farmers' incomes to give a measure of short_-term stability and long-term 
prosperity. But all of these interventions left the family farm-type of 
organization as the most appropriate unit for development of the land within 
the technical and marketing structure provided by government. 
13 It is perhaps not surprising, given its special production and marketing 
problems, that California agriculture has relied on positive government 
intervention apparently to a much greater extent than any other part of 
the United States. The Agricultural Code of California provides for a 
degree of governmental control found in very few other countries. 
Western Europe, which is more prepared to extend the role of national, 
regional and local governments than the United States, generally has a 
less comprehensive set of controls ~han are provided by the marketing 
orders and agreements in force in California. 
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Third, in its critical stages of development, the United States has 
been able to avoid almost completely what Karl Marx characterized as the 
Calvary of Capitalism - that is, under conditions of heavy population. 
pressure on resources, the severe and generally brutal depression or holding 
back of current living standards of the great majority of people in order to 
finance economic growth. 
Even in the United States, to some extent, the welfare of existing 
generations w:as reduced against their wishes for the benefit of posterity. 
This is not perhaps widely recognized because the means whereby the 
economic system achieved the end are not so evident as they are in the 
histories of many other countries. An example. is the railways I freight 
monopolies and concessions of public land. By means of these they were 
able to transfer to themselves part of the product of many individuals 1 
efforts, especially in view of the low supply price of farmers (whether 
immediate immigrants or not). This development served to increase the 
wealth of city financiers, mer1~ants and industrialists, who used much of 
the gain for capital formation .. 
But this transfer from consumption to investment was nothing as 
compared to that experienced by most countries during their "take offs" 
and "break throughs" to sustained economic progress. The depressed 
incomes of the workers of the early Lancashire cotton iiridustry or the 
sufferings of the smallholders and landless laborers rendered destitute by 
the British enclosure movement at the end of the 18th and the beginning of 
the 19th centuries are more typical illustrations. Yet, but for the slums 
of Lancashire during the Industrial Revolution15 or the savage poverty in 
rural England at the same time, as well as the existence of industrialists, 
merchants and landlords interested in using their gains from the low 
supply price of labor to promote growth, the world today would probably 
be materially a much poorer place. 
Again, population pressure was often so severe in Sweden during the 
middle decades of the 19th century that when there was a harvest failure, 
parts of the rural population were forced to live on bread made from the 
barks of trees. There/ as in Britain, population pressure served to keep 
the entrepreneurial class rich and the great majority of people at the 
subsistence level. 
As a final example, Japanese experience is much closer to that of 
Britain or Sweden than to that of the United States. The government took 
great pains to promote technical progress in agriculture and there were 
large numbers of landlords eager to exploit new opportunities. Yet, 
14 The early history of the Grange stands as a reminder that "forced 
savings" played some part in. the earlier development of the United 
States. 
15 So vividly portrayed in the novels of ·Mrs. Gaskell. 
• 
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critically important was the heavy land tax whereby the standard of living 
of the great majority of rural people was kept low, despite their increasing 
productivity and production, in order to finance general economic growth. 
Fourth and last, we can note a few more especially favorable factors 
bearing on the policies used to stimulate growth in the United States and 
Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. As far as the United States 
was concerned, many of the resources of the continent, mineral as well as 
agricultural, could be fairly easily tapped to yield important sources of 
export income. At the same time, foreign capital could be relatively 
easily obtained from Europe, mainly from the United Kingdom, partly because 
the personal and ethnic links of borrower and lender were often fairly close. 
Western Europe was greatly aided in reducing chronic population pressure 
by being able to export much of its surplus population to the open lands 
of North America and Australasia. For example, from 1850 to 1910 almost 
1, 3 0 0, 0 0 0 Swedes emigrated, mainly to the United States; during the same 
period the population remaining in Sweden rose from 3, 500, 000 to 5, 500, 000. 
In the recent experience of underdeveloped countries, we can find 
many instances where rapid economic growth has been assisted by, or has 
been compatible with, institutions and policies similar to those developed 
in the United States, or in certain respects in the United Kingdom, in 
earlier decades. In addition, as will be discussed later in relation to anti-
colonialism, underdeveloped countries ignore many methods of speeding 
economic progress similar to those which played important parts in the 
development of the United States or of the United Kingdom and which would 
often be more appropriate to the ends sought than the policies already 
followed. 
As illustrations of the use made of Western paths to progress consider 
the role of the family farm in certain countries. Ghana has very ~asily 
been able to tap economically the important export income from cocoa 
production on the basis of small-scale peasant production. So has Uganda 
with its coffee and cotton. In some areas of East Africa policies for 
developing peasant farms, largely for self-subsistence but with marketable 
surpluses, seem efficient at the present time and are making progress, 
albeit slow. 
Yugoslavia has modified its original communistic objectives and 
recognizes the value of family farms. Outside certain areas in the 
Danubian plain, where there are important economics of scale, family farms 
seem to be consistent with and probably the cause of much of the recent 
rapid economic progress in agriculture. 16 
16 Some assistance to Yugoslav family farms is coming now from enlightened 
share-cropping schemes which have been worked out between cooperative 
farms and nearby peasants in order to spread new techniques. 
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An example of the use of a different western path to economic advance 
is the great assistance given to ;Puerto Rico by the large-scale migration 
of Puerto Ricans to the United States mainland. 17 
By contrast India provides an illustration of the frequent rejection, 
usually for political reasons, of such "classical" possibilities as remains 
economically appropriate. Migration of labor from India to other Asian 
countries to work on plantations or engage in other unskilled or semi-skilled 
work is now prohibited, in part almost certainly because of the emotional 
association of such a movement of labor with the indentured "coolie" 
migrations to, say, Malaya or the Fiji Islands under British rule. The 
result is to make even more difficult the task of raising living standards in 
the most heavily over-populated areas of India, especially in the South. 
As another and more general example, the handicaps and often sheer 
uncritical prejudices against agricultural merchants engaged in private 
enterprise in some countries, especially expatriates, have already been 
noted. 
But, opportunities to follow the free enterprise path to economic 
progress, whether they are taken or not, frequently represent in underde-
veloped countries the trimmings rather than the heart of ideal policies to 
promote economic growth. This is simply because the basic conditions are 
radically different from those in which growth had to take place in the West, 
especially in the United States. In many underdeveloped countries it is 
totally unrealistic to expect that a movement for economic progress can 
spring from the "grass roots. " The people are frequently illiterate and their 
energies are sapped by backward looking traditions and by inadequate diets. 
In these circumstances, economic revolutions depend upon the initiative of 
fhe, few Revolution must come from the top - that is the government must be 
more directly concerned in promoting economic growth than was the United 
States government in the nineteenth century. If it is wise, the government 
will give great attention to raising the general economic quality of its 
population and it will consider carefully before cramping the activities of 
its entrepreneurial classes whether in private or public enterprise. But in 
the meantime the government will be an important source of initiative. 
Anyone who doubts this should remember, or inform himself about, the role 
of the Japanese government in promoting Japanese economic growth from 
1870 until the beginning of the first world war. 
Again, unless there is a much greater volume of foreign aid than at 
present most underdeveloped countries cannot avoid the Calvary of 
Capitalism - the need to tax the present generation heavily if rapid econom-
ic growth or even if a "breakthrough" is to occur. Such is India's dilemma 
today. It is trying to reconcile the welfare of its present population with 
heavy demands for investment funds necessary to enable real income per 
head to rise appreciably. Again, General Peron's attempts in Argentina 
17 Those who see Puerto Rico as a model for other underdeveloped countries 
should remember that abundant emigration opportunities has probably 
been the pre-condition of the Puerto Rican success story. 
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to establish a state monopoly in meat marketing was conceived and con-
ducted primarily to raise development funtls. The instinct was under-
standable even though the economics was unsound.l8 
As a special corollary, it follows that many underdeveloped countries 
will be loath to abandon institutions which they have developed or in: .... 
herited from previous colonial regimes if these make possible "forced 
savings" to finance growth, - and if they are not associated with earlier 
alleged "colonial exploitation. " In West Africa the various marketing 
boards for export crops in the ex-British territories, such as the Cocoa 
Marketing Board in Ghana, may be cumbersome and unnecessary organiza-
tions if one thinks simply in terms of marketing efficient:y. And futher-
more, export taxes could be used just as efficiently as the boards to hold 
back part of the sale values of crops from producers for use in general 
economic development. But the boards are an administratively efficient • 
means of achieving this last objective. And they work. In view of the 
needs for development fnnds one can understand why governments prefer the 
systems they have rather than experiment with others which mi~ht do the 
j.ob more cheaply. 
Finally, conditions in many underdeveloped countries make the 
nineteenth century-type family farm unsuitable for them. The implications 
of heavy population pressure on the land will be discussed later. Even 
apart from this, the family farm in the traditional American sense is not an 
appropriate form of organization in many areas. Thus direct government 
participation in farming or an efficient private landlordism, if it is political-
ly acceptable, is necessary. The basic development work to be undertaken, 
the lack of initiative and know--how among local people, and perhaps some 
important economics of scale, H 'only in related processing and marketing 
operations, lead to a need for an operation much larger than can be en-
compassed by the individual family farm and, so, a need for a different 
form cof organization. The proportional profit sugar farms in Puerto Rico, 
the landlord-tenant system involved by the one-time plantation workers 
and the Australian Sugar Refining Company in the Fiji Islands or the share-
cropping scheme for cotton in the Sudan are examples .19 
Enlightenment on the reasons for dissimilarities in insitutions and 
policies among nations whose social and political objectives for their own 
societies are the same or are derived from the same ideals, including 
assessment of how far such dissimilarities are inevitable or perhaps even 
necessary, is the known task of research and teaching in comparative 
18 The policy was doomed to failure, mainly because Peron persisted in 
subsidizing domestic consumption but also because no account was 
taken of the vagaries of the widely fluctuating cattle cycle in Argentina. 
See the articles by E. Louise Peffer in Food Research Institute Studies, 
Vol I, No 2, and Vol II, No 1. 
19 For the Fiji Islands see the Australian (formerly Colonial) Sugar Refining 
Company, South Pacific Enterprise, Angus and Robertson, S:ycfney and 
London, 1956. 
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economic and political systems. But the subject is much neglected. Land-
grant colleges should consider giving considerable attention to such analysis 1 
perhaps most of all at the teaching level, for both undergraduates and 
graduates. More specifically, the emphasis should be on agrarian problems 
and their relation to population pressure and economic growth, It should be 
intended to correct, w·here necessary, the natural tendency for anyone to 
interpret events elsewhere by criteria resting consciously or subconsciously 
on the somewhat unique experience of his own country in economic growth. 
There is an abundant literature in English which could be used 1 
covering such topics as the following: the land problem in nineteenth 
century Ireland; the population pressure in the Balkans in the last hundred 
years, leading to the unsuccessful Green Revolution of the 1920'. s and in 
part to the rise of Eastern European Communism; the pre-British system of 
land tenure and taxation in India and the changes made during the period of 
British rule 1 both being considered in relation to policies pursued since 
liberation; rural unrest in Britian in the early nineteenth century and its 
connection to general industrial devel. opment; land tenure systems in Africa 
and the impact of tribal societies and customs; the development and evolu-
tion of plantation systems of agriculture; the technically progressive but, 
for the rural people, materially repressive agricultural development policies 
of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Japan, and considera-
tion in the light of the earlier history of the land reform in Japan carried out 
later World War II. 20 
A synthesis of the main lessons from such histories and experiences 
as these would help greatly towards a wider understanding of the different 
paths to economic growth. Above all, it would show how financial aid from 
the rich countries can enable democracies to be nurtured while material 
progress is being achieved. On the other hand it would show how, without 
such aid, liberally-minded leaders are faced to act in ways harmful to the 
development of democratic institutions in order to maintain economically 
vi sable societies which, only if they are so vi sable, will have any prospect 
of keeping people content to accept as an ultimate goal democratic ideals 
and objectives. 
20 There is unquestionably much valuable literature on similar subjects 
in other languages especially in French and Dutch whose essentials 
could be made quickly available in English at little cost. 
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CAPITAL AND TRADE AIDS TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN THE RICH COUNTRIES 
Trade, not aid, was the demand of many underdeveloped countries a 
few years ago. They need both. As suggested already, the rich countries 
of the West must be prepared to give, or to lend cheaply on a long-term 
basis, much more capital than they have so far. At the same time they 
should assign a high priority to modifying their international trade policies 
in respect to agriculture (and other industries) in order to enable under-
developed countries to secure more of their _needed finances by exports. 
Even if a satisfactory termination of the arms race can be achieved, 
there will still remain one great source of political tension throughout 
the world, namely the pressing need for economic development in the face, 
generally, of intense population pressure. However, to reinforce the point, 
it is hard to see what incentive the Communist Powers would have to accept 
complete disarmament if there remain regions of great economic distress 
and political tension where military intervention might prove profitable. 21 
Therefore, whether judged in terms of charity or of enlightened self-
interest, the record of the West in giving assistance to underdeveloped 
countries is not good. Against this dominant yardstick all of its major 
economic policies are to be judged. Thus the agricultural policies of the 
rich countries of the West, particularly of the United States and Western 
Europe, must be found seriously wanting. 
21 As in Laos. 
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FOOD FOR PEACE 
A projection showing the future demand, supply and surplus food out-
look in the Western Community up to the year 1975 is given in Appendix l,. 
This projection, based on the assumption that farm policies will remain 
unchanged from what they were in the late 1950s, shows that the West 
faces problems of large and accumulating agricultural surpluses for at least 
another 10 years. 
In the United States the main problem will continue to be the principal 
price-supported crops--grains, cotton and tobacco. In Western Europe 
grain surpluses may be minimized by reducing imports. The problem of 
excess production will be relatively mpre serious for milk and certain milk 
products, pork, poultry and eggs. 
The foregoing prognostications are intended simp! y to give a focus, 
Clearly, the underlying assumption that farm policies will remain unchanged 
from what they were in the late 1950s is unrealistic and has only analytical 
validity. The next step is to explore the alternative changes in policy 
which might be undertaken to deal with the surplus problem, taking into 
account the important political constraints on the freedom of action of the 
governments of the United States and Western Europe. 
The Politics of Surplus Agricultural Capacity 
Although many economists often write as if political constraints did 
not exist, such constraints must be considered in deciding what farm policies 
should be recommended to legislators and administrators. To begin with, 
let us consider the politics in the United States and Western Europe involved 
in providing capital aid to underdeveloped countries. 
Undoubtedly, the ideal policy would be one providing greatly increased 
grants or loans of dollars, pounds, francs and marks for the underdeveloped 
countries to spend on whatever capital goods they most wanted, assuming 
they spent wisely. To such an end, the obvious or apparently obvious 
economic policy would be one of securing the quickest reallocation of all 
factors of production within the Western Community, both nationally and 
internationally, so that the gross national products of the rich countries 
concerned could be increased as much as possible and the opportunity to 
increase aid to underdeveloped countries would be maximized. 
But if such economic policies could be pursued, would they in them-
selves lead to any significant increase in aid to underdeveloped countries 
or to any increase at all? Anyone who has studied the European or American 
political scene must surely answer "No." The peoples of these countries are 
so preoccupied with raising their own standards of living that enlightened 
politicians and statesmen cannot by any means do all that they recognize as 
necessary for the underdeveloped countries. None of this is to deny that a 
24 
large increase in foreign aid for economic 1 as distinct from military I de-
velopment may be forthcoming in the years immediately ahead. However I 
the stimulus will be the political struggle with Communism and not the 
increases in gross national products attained in the Western community. 22 
Yet electorates are not always consistent. While they might be 
unprepared to support increased aid provided in the most economic form and I 
therefore, at the lowest overall sacrifice to themselves 1 they may take a 
totally different view when aid is provided in the form of food surpluses. 
The economist does 1 and should 1 usually regard food surpluses as being 
mainly a form of capital which under certain circumstances may permit 
more rapid accumulation of investment goods in underdeveloped countries. 
But the public sees food surpluses in terms of a fight against hunger and 
malnutrition - as c.a>nsumption rather than investment goods. As such I the 
proposal to send food surpluses to underdeveloped countries may capture 
public imagination much more successfully than policies economically more 
rational. 
So "Food for Peace" campaigns are likely to obtain a volume of 
support which other and economically sounder programs of aid would fail to 
obtain. To repeat 1 the case would be stated in terms of reducing hunger 
and malnutrition rather than in aiding deuelopment. Although these are not 
necessarily the same 1 this would not matter. Because of the particular 
reason \Why Western electorates may be prepared to pay the cost of sending 
food surpluses to underdeveloped countries it is unlikely that constraints-
would be imposed on the ways in which the surpluses are used. 
There seems no doubt that "Food for Peace" can have an extremely 
wide and strong appeal. For example 1 take the summary of the current 
situation as given in The World Food Deficit: a First Approximation: 2 3 
"Another way to express the deficit in countries short of food is in 
terms of United States agricultural production. In this highly simplified 
frame of reference I the estimated world food shortage for 1962 may be said 
to be roughly equivalent to 35 percent of U.S. annual milk production ... 
plus 40 percent of U.S. annual dry bean and pea production ... plus 120 
percent of U.S. annual wheat production. This is not to imply that in-
creased U.S. production can 1 or should I be the means of filling the world 
food gap. Other countries must help I too I and this process will evolve 
over many years. This comparison with U.S. production is intended only 
to be a convenient yardstick helpful in visualizing the size of the deficit." 
22 To coin a technical term I the marginal propensity to aid foreign countries 
is probably extremely nehr zero. The Cold War may I however I shift 
the schedule to the right. 
2 3 United States Department of Agriculture I Foreign Agricultural Service I 
March 1961. 
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Such a statement I even though economists may question the validity 
of the specific statistics I can have a direct and widely understandable 
impact. 
Indeed I there is already a wide range of support for economic aid by 
means of food surpluses. The principal churches of the Western world 
have spoken in favor 1 including the World Council of Churches and re-
cently the Roman Catholic Church in a Papal Encyclical, Mater et Magistra. 
If the writer's experience in 1960 and 1961 is typical, urban groups in the 
United States with an interest in humanitarian reforms who invite speakers 
on underdeveloped countries or agricultural policies are keenly interested 
in using existing food surpluses to help the poorer nations. 
Then, many of the agricultural interest groups active! y support 
programs of sending food to aid development, including the International 
Federation of Agricultural Producers, which has as members all of the 
important farm groups in Western Europe, and the National Farmers' Union 
in the United States. In the United States certain commodity interests, 
such as the soybean producers, might oppose policies to produce and use 
surpluses in development because they would fear that their own commercial 
outlets might in some way or other be upset. The national officials and 
representatives of the Farm Bureau would, it appears, take the same 
attitude. 24 Yet it is doubtful whether members of the Farm Bureau would 
generally be opposed to the use of surpluses for aiding underdeveloped 
countries. The National Farmers' Union is openly in support; the National 
Council of Farmers' Cooperatives has recently supported an extension of 
the program. 2 5 
Even in the United Kingdom, where farmers have relatively little 
political bargaining power and where, compared with other western nations, 
the government has greater scope for pursuin~ policies according to the 
orthodoxies of liberal economics, an important official document indicating 
the lines along which British agricultural policy may develop in the next 
few years contains explicit reference to the government's willingness to 
consider "actively to support the proposals recently approved unanimously 
by the United Nations for organizing the distribution of surplus food on a 
multilateral basis through existing international organizations and as a 
part of a wider program for aiding the less developed countries. "26 
24 The 41st annual meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation in 
December 1959, as reflected in its resolution and especially in the re-
port of its Secretary, Mr. Roger Fleming, strongly opposed any attempt 
to widen the scope of Public Law 480 (see the Bureau's Nation's Agriculture , 
January 19 6 0) 
25 Washington Situation, Vol. XXII, No 21, May 26,1961, p. 4 (National 
Council of Farmers' Cooperatives, 1616 H Street N. W. , Washington 6, D.C.) 
26 Agriculture, Report on Talks between the Agricultural Departments and the 
Farmers' Unions, June-December 1960. Cmnd. 1249, Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, London. p. 8 
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The interest, actual or potential, in "Food for Peace" is a great as set 
in assisting the development of the poorer countries. Without it, agri-
cultural policies in the Western Community will be worked out simply as 
the interplay of urban and rural interest,.: groups usually taking short-
sighted views of the situation. In consequence, without the political 
head of steam of a humanitarian and widely-comprehensible appeal, we 
shall get agricultural policies in the United States and in Western Europe 
which, from the point of view of the economic growth of those countries, 
will be no better or hardly better than policies envisaging the production 
and distribution of food surpluses and which, from the point of view of 
aiding underdeveloped countries, will be much less satisfactory than 
"Food for Peace. " 
This view can be sustained by showing what agricultural policies 
are likely to be without an appeal to altruism, especially by demonstrating 
that the allocation of resources between agriculture and other industries in 
the Western Commun'it_y, given the existing political constraints and 
effective choice of programs, will not be affected appreciably for the worse, 
if at all, by "Food for Peace" programs. We can begin by considering the 
United States. 
The basic problem in American agriculture is to remove from the 
industry a large quantity of surplus labor and to enlarge farms. The already 
high rate of migration is insufficient. A proposal frequently made in one 
form or another is to put the Homestead Act into reverse and to provide 
farmers with a financial incentive to leave agriculture. But, for a variety 
of reasons, such as the objection of urban electorates to the apparent 
pensioning off of farmers and the great emotional appeal of policies 
claiming to protect the family farm, such proposals cannot be explicitly 
advocated by politicians who have or who seek responsibility. 
Yet a rose by any other name will smell as sweet, and pensioning 
off redundant farmers is possible under schemes set up in the name of con-
servation. Here there are, broad! y speaking, two alternatives: either a 
farmer can be paid a "rent" for not using, for conserving the whole of the 
land on his farm, or he can be paid a "rent" for not using part of that land. 
From the point of view of securing a better allocation of resources within 
the national economy, the second approach, used to a considerable extent 
in building up the Conservation Reserve in recent years, hardly commends 
itself. The partial idling of individual farms is not likely to increase 
appreciably the release of labor or capital from agriculture. It makes an 
inappreciable contribution towards a more efficient allocation of resources. 
It is but another illustration of the overwhelming characteristic of United 
States agricultural policy at the present time - the tendency to create 
surplus capacity in such a way M to leave large amounts of undergmployed' 
labor and scarce capital scattered throughout the industry. 
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In contrast, the idling of Whole farms is much better from the point of 
view of resource allocation. A farmer who is paid to idle the whole of his 
farm is in a better position to obtain work elsewhere. Thus the need to 
maintain partially unemployed capital equipment on his farm is greatly re-
duced. Precisely because it is more successful in re~l.locating resources, 
the complete idling of farms under the Conservation Reserve Program has 
provoked much opposition. Farmers have left their farms in some areas to 
such an extent that the economic base of the local community is threatened. 
There is a clash with the still widely-held objective of maintaining a large 
number of family farms, even though this may be more nostalgic than 
realistic. Perhaps more important, many trade interests are adversely 
affected. Whatever may be the reasons, the economically more efficient 
form of the Conservation Reserve Program does not now get much political 
support. In general, the Conservation Reserve approach appears to warrant 
little consideration as a means of solving the American farm problem. Other 
measures will be much more important. 27 
Five years ago, before a Congressional Committee, Professor Boulding 
described American farm policy as a charity racket because; in his opinion, 
a large amount of financial aid was given to the great majority of American 
farmers who did not need it and very little to those low income groups which 
did need it. This criticism has been repeated, usually less bluntly, by 
other writers. 28 Inevitably, schemes which directly support the prices of 
farm products rather than providing income grants to the poor farmers will 
give windfall earnings to many producers who already earn large incomes 
in comparison with, for example, skilled factory workers in the towns. 
However, at least for the time being, it seems a fact of American 
agricultural politics that programs directly intended to aid the low income 
groups are unlikely to replace those which are advocated by the National 
Farmers' Union and, no doubt, are supported by many members of the Farm 
Bureau. For example, the National Farmers' Union does not in its policy 
statements pay much attention to the particular problems of the lowest paid 
fifth of American farmers. Moreover, the opposition of the Farm Bureau is, 
according to Lauren Soth, 29 one of the reasons why the Farmers' Home 
Administration has not received adequate funds to carry out its job of bring~ 
ing aid to the low income farmers who need it most. 
Next, we must recognize another ambivalence on the part of urban 
electors, namely their preference for concealed subsidies to agriculture 
instead of open ones, even though the latter might be cheaper. Subsidies 
27 Although outside the economic considerations of this paper, the United 
States Government may also need to consider the political effects in land 
hungry underdeveloped countries of those programs which put American 
agricultural productive capacity out of use. 
28 For example, by Lauren Soth in Farm TrQubles, Princetown University 
Press , 19 57 . 
29 Op. cit. p. 90 
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paid directly to farmers appear clearly in the financial statements of the 
United States. On the other hand, it is much harder to see the subsidies 
which are concealed in the higher prices which come about when farm 
supply is restricted. Thus, with the exception of wool, United States 
agricultural policy has not relied upon the deficiency payment system which 
has been the core of the British system of supporting agriculture even though 
this system has manifest advantages in expanding consumption, especially 
among low income urban groups. 30 
In all, it is not surprising that United States agricultural policy 
should develop along the lines of the 1961 Emergency Corn Program and the 
programs envisaged in the emaciated version of Secretary Freeman's 
Omnibus Bill passed in July 1961, namely towards concealed subsidies 
through supply control. To these measures we should now turn, recognizing 
that they represent the policies which an appeal to international human-
itarianism could improve very mucP:. 
There are many precedents in United States agricultural policy, 
especially in cotton and in tobacco and more generally in the agriculture of 
California, for restricting supply by administrative production control. 
Yet, the most interesting starting point, partly because of the light it 
throws on the mistakes which can be made when political constraints to 
economic policy are ignored or inadequately discussed, is the work of the 
intellectual architect of the current farm programs, Dr. Willard Cochrane. 
As head of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics he is the principal economic 
advisor on agricultural matters to Secretary Orville Freeman and to 
President Kennedy. 
In his book, Farm Prices: Myth or Reality, and in his subsequent 
presidential address to the American Farm Economics Association, 31 Dr. 
Cochrane arg1.1ed the case for nation-wide powers to restrict production 
of agricultural commodities as necessary. The key to his proposals was 
that each farmer should have production rights, issued briginally on a 
historical basis, which he would be free to dispose of as he thought fit. 
"Each marketing certificate would be negotiable. Each farmer would be 
free to buy or sell marketing certificates as he saw fit. By this device 
freedom of entry and exit would be maintained within a controlled agri-
culture; and the individual farm operator would be free to expand production, 
or contract .it, in light of local conditions, as total output was adjusted 
to demand at a defined fair price. The value of operating in a stablized 
agriculture where product prices and returns were relatively certain and 
relatively good, and where long-range production plans could be formulated 
with reasonable assurance of materializing would be capitalized of course 
into those marketing certificates. The price of these certificates would 
become a cost of doing business in a stablized agriculture. n32 
30 British electors would probably be just as ambivalent were it not that 
about half of the United Kingdom's food is imported and so is not sub-
sidized by the British Treasury. 
31 Journal of Farm Economics, December 1959. 
32 Farm Prices: Myth and Reality, University of Minnesota Press, 1958, p. 173 
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As a device for creating windfall incomes for farmers who originally 
would receive the production rights, Dr. Cochrane's proposals need not be 
considered here. But, as an aid towards more efficient allocation of 
resources, they merit attention and have much to commend them. If they 
had been or could be implemented as he envisaged, they would permit the 
required freedom for geographical changes in production within the United 
States needed for continuing economic efficiency. Even more important, 
the scheme would not handicap other plans to speed up the exodus of 
surplus labor and the capital associated with it. Indeed, the saleable 
production quotas might aid the movement of surplus factors of production 
out of agriculture; the right to produce would become a capital asset. 
Especially if it were in no way tied to production on a particular piece of 
land, 33 it would give low income farmers a much stronger incentive to 
move from the industry. Farmers could make much larger capital gains 
(than would be possible without quotas) by selling to more efficient 
farmers. These farmers could either use the land more profitably, perhaps 
in conjunction with that already possessed, or could transfer the right 
to produce to land which was more fertile or in a more economic location. 
As Professor G. E. Brandow has said, "Quotas would be worth more to 
efficient producers than to inefficienct ones and a strong pull would be 
exerted to shift production accordingly .•. and perhaps labor might leave 
farming faster this way than in the usual situation where a man who 
ceases to farm can liquidate his investment only by selling to another 
man who will farm the same land. u34 
Unfortunately to be acceptable in the United States any industry-
wide scheme for limiting agricultural production would almost certainly 
not allow any quotas to be fully negotiable. The history of supply control 
in the United States ·g'ives virtually unequivocal support for the view that 
at the present time any new production quotas imposed would be made 
unalienable from the land to which they were originally attached. 35 
Some commentators on Dr. Cochrane's proposals saw these difficulties 
clearly enough, for example Professor Brandow in his paper mentioned above 
and some of the discussants of it. Professor Brandow questioned whether 
fully marketable quotas would be acceptable in view of the strong traditions, 
the almost nostalgic traditions, for maintaining the family farm as the basis 
of United States agriculture. "The income goal in agriculture is often 
linked with a strong desire to maintain numbers of farms and farmers and to 
halt the trend toward the commercial agriculture ... Improved income is 
3 3 And this is how Dr. Cochrane envisaged production quotas in his writings. 
34 Journal of Farm Economics, December 1960, p. 1172 
35 Lest this should be thought wisdom after the emaciating of the Onmibus 
Bill, the writer was arguing this point in seminars at Berkeley in the 
early spring of 1961 and in a radio discussion with Professor David Allee, 
recorded for K.P'f.A. in May 1961. In this he was following a few 
earlier critics of Dr. Cochrane's proposals. 
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regarded as a means of preserving the status in farming and some of the 
support for supply control has come from persons who expected it to do 
this. u36 In the same vein, a Farm Bureau representative commented, 
"Supply control is. being advocated as a means of preserving the family 
farm by groups that apparently hope to prevent further declines in the 
number of farms. Supply control bil~s introduced in the 86th Congress, 
as the Family Farm Income Act in 1960, were not neutral on farm size," 
several variations being proposed which directly or indirectly Were relatively 
favorable to the small farm. 37 Then, sure enough, the representative of 
the Farmers 1 Union, which in its own words "is dedicated to the preserva-
tion and improvement of the owner-operated family farm," stated his 
organization Is opposition to marketable quotas. "Democratically elected 
farmer committees probably should be given greater authority ... to set up 
flexible safeguards against the permanent alienation of sales quotas or 
acreage allotments by farmers who may not be fully aware of their value ... 
Experience with the Conservation Reserve indicates that primary emphasis 
on the whole-farm approach does not lend the program any great public 
popularity in the areas (denoted) as the extensive margin ... There is also 
a deep feeling in rural America that each farmer should take his fair share 
of the adjustment required to bring supply into balance with demand. 
Temporary retirement of whole farms is neither needed nor justified. More-
over, it has proved to be unnecessarily destructive of the family farm 
pattern of agricultural settlement and of rural neighborhoods, communities and 
and trade centers. u38 
In addition to these objections to fully marketable quotas, there are 
more contingent material ones. Again, to quote the representative of the 
Farm Bureau, "Vested interests in keeping crop production where it is 
would stimulate powerful Congressional opposition to the transfer of 
production rights across state lines ,39 These vested interests would 
include merchants and other commercial concerns in the areas from which 
production would most likely be moved by the sale of production quotas. 
An appraisal of all the political constraints, value judgements and 
historical experience bearing upon the formation of United States agri-
cultural policy at the present time leads to the conslusion that any extensive 
scheme of supply control would have one dominant feature. Broadly 
speaking, quotas would remain attached to the land on which they were 
originally granted and the original allocations would be historically 
determined by sharing out any initial production reductions proportionately 
among producers, with perhaps some bias in favor of the small-scale 
producers. Thus it seems politically inevitable that any scheme which 
36 Journal of Farm Economics, December 1960, p. 1177 
3 7 Op . cit . , p . 118 6 
38 Op. c~t., pp. 11.80-1 
39 Op: cit.~ p~ 1187 
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proposes to match demand and supply by restricting supply will result in a 
wider scatter of excess capacity throughout United States agriculture. 
With large amounts of labor and capital equipment idled, there would be 
little reduction in the total costs of producing supplies. In the case of 
grain crops, for example, there would be a saving in seed, more or less 
proportional to the decrease in planted acreage and a less than proportionate 
reduction in the use of fertilizers. There would also be some slight saving 
in user costs of capital equipment. But labor costs and most other capital 
costs would have to be carried by the smaller output. 
Therefore, given the principal features of United States agricultural 
policy resulting from the political constraints, namely the limited opportuni-
ties for using the more allocatively efficient version of the Conservation 
Reserve Program and the inevitable creation of excess capacity under 
supply control', the opportunity cost of producing surpluses is much lower 
than their cost at current support prices to the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
perhaps only a small fraction of this cost. Given the policies likely to be 
acceptable, the .£.2§! of producing surpluses.!§. very little ~than the cost 
of avoiding them in terms of the total resources used and denied to other 
sectors of the economy. This conclusion is fundamental and is radically 
different from one based on an economic analysis implicit~y assuming 
complete freedom of political action. This is why so many of the criticisms 
by economists of the surplus disposal program financed under Public Law 480 
are wide of the mark. 4 0 
Broadly speaking, the political constraints are much the same in 
Western Europe as they are in the United States. On the continent of 
Europe the agricultural interest groups are strong and in part of France, at 
least, fairly militant - as was seen in the summer of 1961. The political 
tradition of maintaining a peasantry, the continental European equivalent 
to the United States ideal of the family farm, is still important. The 
agrarian interests are more closely identified perhaps with the so-called 
conservative elements in continental European politics than in the United 
States. Their support is an important element in the majorities of Dr,. 
Adenauer in Germany and of the Christian Democrats in Italy. Finally, 
agricultural policy must often be linked to problems of depressed regions 
as, for example, Brittany and southwest France and southern Italy. In 
southwest France, the existing low levels of agricultural income are already 
an important source of political support for right-wing parties which, if 
they became more powerful than they now are, would undoubtedly undermine 
the authority of the present government. The poverty of southern Italy, on 
the other hand, provides much of the support for the Italian Communist 
Party. 
40 For example those of Prof~ssor T. W. Schultz in the Journal of Farm 
Economics, December 1960. 
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The United Kingdom at present presents a remarkably different 
picture I partly owing to the relatively weak bargaining power of the farm 
bloc. In addition 1 there is a long-established tradition of using deficiency 
payment systems for providing support to farm incomes. These have the 
effect of carrying supplies more easily into consumption and of avotding 
surpluses. In recent years there ha.s been a marked tendency to move toward 
direct or indirect income support for low income farm groups in place of 
"blanket" price support which aids rich and poor farmers alike. However I 
if and when the United Kingdom joins the European Economic Community I 
its agricultural policies will have to be modified to become more akin to 
those followed on the continent. 
Western Europe can use one other means of dealing with its agri-
cultural surplus problem to an extent not possible for the United States. 
It can increasingly protect its agriculture from foreign competition and 
reduce imports of agricultural products so that demand and supply for home-
produced supplies can be made more nearly to balance. Western Europe can 
export its surplus agricultural capacity to other parts of the Western 
Community and outside it. Such a policy is explicitly envisaged by the 
European Economic Community. 
In addition 1 even orthodox free market economic adjustments in 
European countries may lead to the same effect if the result is to throw 
adjustments upon other governments which cannot react Within- the same 
political-economic framework. Thus 1 if Western Europe attempted to reduce 
supplies of domestically produced livestock products by a straight price 
reduction 1 the effect would be to reduce the need for the imporrted animal 
feeds and so to build up surpluses within the United States. A similar 
illustration would have been provided by the recently announced policy of 
the British Government to limit milk production I if farmers had agreed. 41 
It proposed to introduce 'a two-tier system of prices to producers. A high 
price would have been paid on an initial quota I allocated presumably 
according to the individual farmer's past production. All additional supplies 
would have been bought at a much lower price. The aim and effect would 
have been to reduce imports of feed. One country's economizing i's another 
country's surplus! · 
There is perhaps one important difference between the political factors 
bearing on United States agricultural policy and those relevant for Western 
Europe. Given the geophysical conditions of the two continents 1 it may be 
easier for Western Europe I within the constraint of maintaining farm 
incomes both nationally and regionally 1 to change the product mix of its 
agriculture towards livestock products I including milk. In other words 1 
Western Europe may I if it wishes and especially if it is assisted by the 
United States I be able to move more easily to policies which will produce 
surpluses in the forms which are mostvaluable to underdeveloped countries. 
41 See Appendix 2 1 footnote 20 
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Trade Policies 
The political appraisal should not end here. There is one other 
major consideration. Generally speaking, agricultural protection andre-
lated policies within the rich countries of the West have probably not 
raised their national incomes at the expense of those of underdeveloped 
countries in the long run. For example, United States cotton policy, 
while it led to considerable short-term instability in prices in 1956, has 
provided an umbrella for cotton production in many underdeveloped countries. 
Again, price discrimination in international markets, an integral part of 
United States support policy for wheat, has probably served to maintain the 
gross receipts of other major wheat producers. If anything, it is the main 
importing countries, such as United Kingdom, who have "paid" for the 
United States subsidized sales of wheat to low income countries and not 
Australia, Canada and Argentina. In general, United States price supports 
have probably served to maintain the terms of trade of many primary 
producers at higher levels than would have been reached in a free market. 
There are, however, important exceptions which often bear heavily 
upon the economies of a few poor countries. The outstanding example is 
sugar. The sustained and often increasing production of sugar beet in 
Western Europe and the United States in the last half century has depressed 
the incomes of many tropical sugar cane producers who have few or no 
alternative employment opportunities. It is doubtful whether the bilateral 
purchase agreements, such as that between the United Kingdom and the 
West Indies ,or, until recently, that between the United States and Cuba 
have provided a complete compensation. Other examples in the future 
might be American discrimination against the export of ftutts and vegetables 
from Mexico into the United States or, perhaps, similar European discrimina-
tion against North African horticultural exports into the European Economic 
Community. 42 Such specific elements of agricultural protection as these 
are today the most difficult to justify in terms of the economic needs of 
underdeveloped countries. In the present context, protection of other agri-
cultural products grown in the rich countries is less important. 
Any agricultural policy which gives a greater measure of economic 
security to the most prominent and influential interest groups within the 
agricultures of the Western Community, and these generally are those 
which produce the most needed agricultural surpluses, may make it possible 
to break up some of the log-rolling alliances which are common in the 
agricultural politics of the West. In this way we may rid ourselves of the 
elements of agricultural protection which most directly harm primary 
producers in a few vulnerable underdeveloped countries. 
42 The heavy import duties on coffee in certain European countries, such as 
Italy and Finland, may have had a similar if less severe effect in so 
far as, given an inelastic supply, the primary producer has "paid" part 
of the tax. These import duties are imposed for revenue purposes and 
not to protect an indigenous industry, w:h ich obviously does not exist, 
and fall outside the scope of the present discussion. 
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Conclusions 
The West needs agricultural policies immediately which will assist 
as much as possible the economic development of the poor countries of 
the world. To be developed quickly and not simply many years hence I 
such policies must be based upon a realistic appraisal of the political 
constraints bearing on farm affairs in the United States and Western 
Europe. The main points to note are: 
1. Schemes to restrict supply or to extend the scope of "Food for 
Peace" are the only politically practical alternatives. 
2. In terms of resources denied to other industries a policy designed 
to use agricultural surplus capacity to produce "Food for Peace" 
will cost little more than policies to maintain or raise farm 
incomes by restricting supply. 
3. A large political head of steam can be built up to support enlarged 
"Food for Peace" programs so that it would be difficult for future 
f.:ramers of agricultural policies to ignore this claim qn resources. 
4. In order most effectively to assist undeveloped countries by 
extending "Food for Peace I" it wilLbe necessary to change the 
product mix of the likely food surpluses towards more animal 
proteins 1 especially dried milk. This will be easier to achieve 
in Western Europe than in the United States. 
5. A combined operation among the countries of the Western Community 
is desirable I partly because Western European countries otherwise 
will tend to export their agricultural surplus capacity to the United 
States (and to other countries) . 
6. In association w'ith giving farmers assured and satisfactory 
markets for most farm products by means of "Food for Peace 1 " 
it inay be possible for the West to abandon or reduce protection 
on a few commodities 1 especially on (beet) sugar 1 which provide 
major actual or potential sources of income for a few under-
developed countries. 
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A POLITICO-ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF EXISTING 
AND POSSIBLE "FOOD FOR PEACE" PROGRAMS 
In the light of the foregoing politico-economic considerations I 
a totally different appraisal should be· made of the value of agri-: 
cultural surpluses in· aiding ·economic progress 'in underdev_eloped . 
countries. This appraisal would show not only that producing and using 
food surpluses for development is economically more valuable than is. 
generally thought 1 but that I as a corollary, many topics need to be system-
atically investigated in order that "Food for Peace" programs are as scien-
tifically worked out and appraised as are programs for restricting supply. 
Likewise the appraisal would redress the present research emphasis on 
restriction schemes at the expense of almost completely ignoring surplus 
disposal programs. 43 
We can begin by considering the criticisms _raised against 
programs carried out under Public Law 480 in the United States. 44 
Professor T. W. Schultz has best stated the principal position of the 
critics. 45 He points out that up to the end of 1959 the dollar gain from 
selling agricultural surplus products was 10 to 15 percent of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation costs of acquiring and storing these surpluses. Against 
this 1 he suggests that the real value of the food I principally wheat 1 to 
underdeveloped countries was only some 37 percent of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation costs. This last figure he derives as follows. The 
export market value of wheat has been only 75 percent of Commodity Credit 
Corporation costs. Since underdeveloped countries would prefer other 
forms of capital or I better still I money·w·hich could be spent on any form of 
capital 1 Dr. Schultz guesses that surplus wheat is worth only one half of 
its market value to its recipients. 
A Defense of "Food For Peace" 
The objections to this analysis are many 1 especially if it is used to 
cast doubt on future better-planned and larger-scale programs. Commodity 
Credit Corporation costs of storage would clearly be proportionally much 
less in future schemes whereby surpluses were moved more rapidly into 
consumption in underdeveloped countries than in the past. But 1 even if we 
43 Only a few economists have given much attention in their work to the use 
of food surpluses 1 notably Dr. Lawrence Witt. 
44 The controversial barter transactions which were originally important in 
disposing of some of the United States surpluses may be ignored because 
they have been discontinued. 
45 Journal of Farm Economics, December 1960, especially p. 1026 
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accept his numerical propositions, the analysis of the previous section 
suggests that his comments are misleading. In the relevant political con-
text, the opportunity costs of surpluses are probably more than 10 to 15 
percent of Commodity Credit Corporation acquisitions costs and so, even 
by Schultz 1 yardsticks, are probably worth having. 
Much more important, his assumption that food has such a low 
priority in the development programs of underdeveloped countries is ex-
tremely dubious. For example, the income elasticity of demand for grains 
in India has been shown by experience to be much higher than was thought 
a few years ago. This becomes more apparent when account is taken of the 
extent to which Indian cultivators used the opportunity of rising incomes 
to retain their own production for self-consumption. 46 
Without the surpluses provided under ·Public Law 480 India would 
undoubtedly have been obliged to spend much more fore'ign reserve on 
importing wheat in recent years. Dr. Schultz has been unjustifiably 
pessimistic concerning the economic value of benefits derived by under-
developed countries from Public Law 480. 
A frequent criticism of "Food for Peace" programs is that surpluses 
sent to underdeveloped countries will handicap the development of indige-
nous agriculture. It is contended that surpluses depress prices received 
by local farmers, that farmers 1 incentives to produce are reduced. Such an 
assertion, even if true in respect to its effects on local prices, depends 
for its validity upon the sh9,pe of the short-run and long-run supply curves. 
Also upon factors causing these curves to shift to the right which do not 
necessarily or generally correspond to the situation in underdeveloped 
countries. First, as noted earlier, in many underdeveloped economies 
today where marketed supplies are but a small portion of total indigenous 
46 "The marginal elasticity of demand for grain with re.::>pect to income now 
appears to be much higher in India than the 0. 3 to 0. 4 determined from 
information than (19 54) available. During recent years, as Indian wheat 
production has risen, market arrivals at the city have not increased pro-
portionately. Apparently with their cash income aided by land reform, 
better credit facilities, and somewhat better farm income, small and 
traditionally hungry Indian farmers have preferred to eat a good part of 
their additional production rather than to sell it. For substistence 
farmers this marginal income elasticity has apparently been nearer 1. 0. 
Indian economists now estimate the nation-wide elasticities as 0. 6 for 
rural areas, and 0. 4 for urban ones." Mordecai Ezekiel, Journal of 
Farm Economics, December 1960, p. 1070 
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agricultural production the short-run agricultural supply curve (even if 
not the production schedule) may be backward sloping. 47 
Second, even if the long-run supply and production curves are not 
backward sloping they are almost certainly not highly elastic. In many 
underdeveloped countries the shifts of the long-run curve are more sig-
nificant for planning purposes than the shape of the curve. These shifts 
are generally attained in the earlier stages of growth, when emphasis is on 
crops rather than on livestock, when there are few if any direct price 
incentives to farmers. The agricultural history of Japan up to the beginning 
of this century, for example, shows that a fairly severe regime of depressing 
farmers' incomes in conjunction with an active program to achieve technical 
progress in agricultural and to disseminate its results widely is compatible 
with rapid economic progress in the agrarian sector. 
Without necessarily advocating such measures for the agricultures of 
underdeveloped countries today, it seems clear that frequently a similar 
balance of production stimuli is appropriate. The writer agrees strongly 
with Dr. R. 0. Olson. "It would be profitable for most farmers (in un-
developed countries) to increase their use of irrigation water, improved 
seeds, fertilizers and insecticides even with much lower farm prices. 
The failure to increase yield is not due to lack of price incentive but to 
lack of knowledge, nonavailability of fertilizers, lack of credit, etc. 
Advances of 'this form depend less updn price incenfives than 
upon government action in providing ·more irrigation ahd drainage 
facilities, an · aggressiv~ extension program, an. efficient agri-
cultural supply system and an effective credit system. To me,· there 
seems no reason to believe the Public Law 480 imports should slacken 
governments efforts along these lines unless they viewed our surplus 
program as a permanent phenomenon. "48 
In any case, the critics of Public Law 480 do not advance evidence 
to support the view that surpluses have depressed prices for cultivators in 
most underdeveloped countries. By contrast, Dr. Sen notes that in India 
"There has not been any occasion since Public Law 480 supplies started in 
1956 for prices to fall to such a low level as to discourage domestic 
production." 49 
Finally, it is hard to sustain the view that the availability of surpluses 
has caused or will cause underdeveloped countries to neglect their agri-
cultural development programs. Pakistan has given priority to agriculture 
in its economic planning so far. 
47 R. 0. Olson, Journal of Farm Economics, December 1960, p. 1042 and 
Lawrence Witt, S. report of the Seminar on Demand for Farm Products, 
Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, Ames, Iowa, 1959, 
p. 57, as well as the quotation from Mordecai Ezekiel already cited. 
48 R. 0. Olson, op. cit., p.l044 
49 Dr. S. R. Sen of the Indian Planning Commission, Journal of Farm 
Economics, December 1960, p. 1034 
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The reasons for the neglect of agriculture in particular cases must be 
sought elsewhere. In the writer's view, India paid insufficient attention to 
agriculture in both the first and second Five-Year Plans, especially in the 
second. But this was due to the prestige associated with manufacturing 
industries and to the widely-held view that unbalanced economic growth 
with heavy emphasis on industries such as coal and steel was in the 
economic interest of India. Surpluses were not important at the time when 
the first plan was drawn up, and it is almost impossible to believe that 
their possible availability had such an impact on the general climate of 
opinion under which the second plan was formulated for the years 1956-61 
as to encourage neglect of indigenous agriculture. The contrary was true, 
as will be seen below. In any case, experience has modified earlier views, 
and Indian agriculture will receive proportionately much more attention 
under the third plan than it did under the second. 
In the past much of the opposition in underdeveloped countries 
against accepting food surpluses sprang from the year-to-year arranging of 
the disposal programs and the resulting uncertainty concerning the regularity 
of supplies. These fears were well founded. In 1959 a drought in Western 
Europe and a rise in the commercial demand for dried milk prompted the 
United States to suspend donations for export, with a resultant sharp re-
duction in school-feeding and other nutritional schemes in underdeveloped 
countries. 50 
Clearly, "Food and Peace" programs must not be based on such ex-
pediences. This judgment is now recognized, as illustrated by the emphasis 
being placed on the new Title IV provisions of Public Law 480 under which 
cheap, long-term loans are being provided for underdeveloped countries to 
purchase food supplies. The recent four-year agreement between the 
United States and India, covering large quantities of wheat and rice, provides 
the first important pointer to the new thinking. Indeed, the provisions of 
this agreement were taken into account when the Indian planners were 
drawing up the third Five-Year Plan. 
Various other illustrations can be provided in support of the view that 
agricultural imports have a higher priority in the development programs of 
underdeveloped countries than the critics of Public Law 480 suggest. 
Professor Witt has referred to the case in which cotton supplies sent to the 
Philippines in recent years averted a shortage mf raw material which other-
wise would have led to a licensing scheme, most like]y favoring a few mills 
and leading to a decline in competition within the Philippine textile 
industry. 51 
50 M. Ezekiel, Journal of Farm Economics, p. 1069 
51 A Report of the Seminar on Demand for Farm Economics, Center for 
Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, Ames, Iowa, 1959, p. 56 
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Food surpluses can be and are being used to build a world food 
reserve. Many benefits will spring from this reserve. In general, under-
developed countries have less control over the effect of weather on agri-
cultural production than developed countries have. Thus they are faced 
with the problem of much more seasonal and year-to-year variations in 
total food supplies. In consequence, they must often attach high priority 
to policies which will minimize the danger of local, regional or national 
food shortages even though in other respects such policies may be extremely 
uneconomic. Thus, for example, it has been common in many parts of East 
Africa for regional and local governments to work for and maintain a high 
degree of self-sufficiency in food production instead of promoting the 
cultivation of normally more profitable cash crops. They do this lest other 
regions, from which locally requi'red food supplies would normally be 
obtained, prohibit or severely restrict export sales of food crops in the 
event of a poor harvest. Thus many advantages of regional specialization 
are lost. Again, the need to secure greater control over the effects of 
the weather is one reason advanced to support 'the case for irrigation 
schemes which, like some of the multi-purpose river valley projects in 
India, are often extremely uneconomic except perhaps if judged in terms 
of the overriding need for security. A food reserve is a cheaper way of 
achieving that end. 
The general food supply situation in India underscores the point. 
Sometimes the supply fails in one district and sometimes in another. The 
difference between an adequate local food supply and local famine is often 
extremely small and depends upon the ability to move marginal supplies 
quickly to where they are most needed. But transport and storage shortages 
make such balancing movements extremely difficult. This is especially so 
as private merchants hold supplies for higher prices when a shortage 
threatens, thus precipitating a destabilizing specual tion. The famous 
Bengal famine of 1943 was greatly exacerbated by the shortage of transport 
and by resultant specualtion of merchants. 
So far in India governmental regulations have probably made the 
problems worse. Price and zonal restrictions have been imposed but 
without sufficient administrative backing or food reserves to be implemented 
effectively. Similarly, the government's own direct entry into the grain trade 
does not appear to have reduced prices. But, there will soon be sufficient 
storage capacity to establish a decentralized food reserve in India and much 
of the supplies under the recent Title IV agreement are intended for that 
reserve. The reserve will enable India to reduce many of the economic 
wastes associated with an erratic climate, although probably, another 
half million tons of rice are needed to make the reserve fully secure. 
Extensive government trading or cumbersome regulations to c.ontrol 
the undesirable speculative aspects of the private wholesale grain trade 
will be much less necessary than before. Releases from the reserve can 
be used for a counter-speculative purpose, while the private trade can be 
left to perform the functions it fulfills economically. 
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Coordination Between United States and Europe 
We may summarize the position which has emerged in the last few 
pages as follows. There is not yet sufficient information to provide a 
reasonably precise estimate of the-value of food surpluses for underdeveloped 
countries and, so, provide the "shadow prices" which should be attributed 
to them in evaluating their worth in relation to resources used by the West 
in producing them. But, the available evidence suggests that a considerable 
extension of "Food for Peace" programs is economically justified. The 
critics have greatly underestimated the value of food surpluses and 
greatly overassessed the opportunity costs of securing them. 
Given these conclusions and the virtually certain emergence of 
substantial agricultural surpluses in West Europe within a few years, one 
main issue remains to be considered- the co-ordination of "Food for Peace" 
programs between the United States and Western Europe. The treatment 
of this most important issue w'ill only touch on a few of the most significant 
points. A fuller analysis would include such matters as bringing Canada, 
New Zealand, and Australia into the arrangement. 
The European surpluses are likely to be principally milk or products 
raised on land which could, with hardly any extra incentive to farmers 
other than a guaranteed market, be diverted to milk. At the same time, 
Western European milk production is highly seasonal, depending on the 
summer flush of grass, because supplemental winter feeds are costly to 
grow or under existing arrangements have to be imported, irrespective of 
the value of the end product, at equally costly "world market" prices. 
Considerable seasonal surplus capacity is found not only on farms but 
also coincidentally in the milk processing industries, including dried milk 
factories. Although a dried milk factory could not work throughout the 
year at the rate of its busiest month without substantially increasing costs 
and although there would be additional user and other operating costs if 
the plant were more intensively worked, the opportunity costs of processing 
substantial quantities of additional dried milk from existing capacity is 
probably small. In addition, if Western Europe begins to idle land and to 
restrict milk supplies throughout the season, then the opportunity costs of 
producing more dried milk would still be low even if more factory capacity 
had to be constructed. The same argument applies, although to a lesser 
extent in view of the savings in transport costs, if European milk production 
is reduced by policies intended to reduce the degree of intensive production 
and of dependence on imported feeds. However, in this case the surplus 
capacity would be largely exported to the feed grain areas of the United 
States and other countries and the problem simply transferred to other 
parts of the Atlantic Community. 
In these circumstances should we not explore the possibilities of a 
joint operation between the United States and Western Europe to produce 
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dried milk? Western Europe would contribute the cows and associated 
farm labor I summer feed and dried milk factory capacity. The United States 
would supply the supplemental winter feeds from its grain stocks. Importantly 
these feeds would be priced in relation to the estimated sale value of the 
dried milk to underdeveloped countries and not at the "world market" price 
which Western Europe pays for feed grains for its own use. 
(A similar scheme could 1 of course 1 be operated within the United 
States. One topic for research might be how surplus feed grains might be 
divided between purely American and combined American-European schemes 
so that a given quantity of dried milk were produced at the lowest opportunity 
cost.) 
Implications for the Land-Grant Colleges 
Given the political constraints on the evolution of agricultural 
policies in the West 1 "Food for Peace" programs seem an extremely good 
"second best" means of aiding the economic development of many countries. 
More detailed investigations would probably show that underdeveloped 
countries would be justified in importing large quantities of surplus foods I 
not simply to reduce the hunger or malnutrition of their people I but to 
finance investment projects. In these circumstances there are two 
principal conclusions relating to the current and future work of the Land-
grant colleges. 
First, more attention should be given in the teaching programs of the 
colleges to Political Science in relation to agricultural policy. Such interest 
would provide an important corrective against overemphasis of policy 
recommendations drafted without sufficient attention to the political con-
straints surrounding the situation under discussion. For example 1 if a 
number of agricultural economists had considered in detail the political 
aspects of farm policy in the United States I it is extremely doubtful that 
Dr. Willard Cochrane's proposals for supply control would have escaped 
with such little criticism as they have received - and thus that current 
United States agricultural policy and policy discussion would be so much 
orientated towards costly forms of supply restriction. In the writer's 
opinion the failure to check sufficiently the political realism of Dr. Cochrane's 
analysis is an important reason why controversy during the last year about 
United States agricultural policy has failed to fasten on the most important 
issue - solving the surplus problem in ways most consistent with aiding 
underdeveloped countries - and why the public is less aware than it could 
be of the connection between United States farm policy and the problems of 
underdeveloped countries. 
Second 1 and of more immediate importance 1 there has been little 
research on the possibilities for solving the farm problem by means of 
"Food for Peace" programs acceptable to underdeveloped countries as an 
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alternative to existing restriction, schemes. Much research has been under-
taken concerning the effects of the Conservation Reserve Program and ways 
in which it might be extended. Even more effort has been devoted to 
measuring the factors which must be considered in appraising and implement-
ing proposals to restrict supply. Is there not a lack of balance? 
Topics which might be examined include the opportunity for convert-
ing feed grain surpluses into dried milk for special nutritional feeding 
schemes I especially as a joint operation between the United States and 
Western Europe I and appraisal of all the factors which must be considered 
in working out the correct 11 shadow prices 11 for food imports in the develop>-
ment programs of underdeveloped countries. Also estimates of the detailed 
food requirements 1 including their relation to other investment needs I 
of particular projects in underdeveloped countries. 
Have we not an obligation to give at least as much assistance to 
Mr. McGovern as we give to Mr. Freemen? And when they appear 1 to 
Mr. McGovern•s opposite numbers in Western Europe? 
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ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION 
IN THE AGRICULTURAL AND AGRARIAN SECTORS 
In discussing the use of American and European agricultural excess 
capacity, the previous part of this paper has asserted that if economists 
are to provide useful policy recommendations they must explicitly take 
account of the political constraints within which particular policies are 
to be formed or modified. Many economists would not accept this position 
and would feel that their obligation in the field of policy is to set out the 
various alternative courses of action and the costs and benefits associated 
with them, assuming that there is complete freedom of political action. 
In this way, they would say, the economic costs of particular politically 
inspired policies are shown. 
There is, of course, a place for both of these approaches, for 
political economy and for the "purer" economics. In this part of the 
paper the emphasis is shifted to an appraisal which ignores the interplay 
of political and economic forces and which remains "purely economic" 
in the sense that this term is normally understood. However, it is recog-
nized that recommendations derived from economic analysis of reso1-1rce 
allocation and growth contain implicit political objectives or recommenda-
tions. The purpose is to consider whether sufficient attention is given in 
research and advanced economic study to questions of the efficiency of 
structures required to perform various functions, such as in marketing, in 
land tenure, or in geographical patterns of settlement of rural populations. 
The need for such an examination is urgent. Many important is su~s 
are being ignored or insufficiently examined, whether concerning the:· 
richer or poorer nations, often in favor of topics which, in terms of their 
contribution to public information and policy needs, are already well 
explored at the economic level of from which the marginal returns of 
further exploration are likely to be extremely low. 
In part, because many students from the poorer countries are now 
coming to the land-grant institutions (and to other western universities) 
there is need for a particular intellectual leadership, both by example and 
by instruction. For a multitude of reasons which are political and often 
associated with "anti-colonialism," many J,mderdeveloped countries pursue 
extremely self-damaging economic policies. But generally they do not 
recognize this fact. Students coming from these countries need much 
more training than they now get in examining the efficiency of various 
economic structures of a society in adjusting themselves (i.e. , the 
structures) and in transmitting incentives to change so as to maximize 
economic growth. To this end, the foreign students need to see their 
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teachers in the United States making more use of the techniques relevant 
to the problems of the underdeveloped countries. 
Too often today the efficiency of economic structural organization 
is taken for granted or false conclusions are reached from inductive 
analysis of historical experience. Stated another way, as the older 
welfare economics relates to the use of resources it is too often ignored, 
even after allowance is made for its possible transformation into a more 
complex and diversified analytical system to take note of recent theoretical 
and applied studies. 52 
It is important, not simply that more time be spent in describing 
how economic structures develop and how they transmit, fully or in part, 
economic incentives for changes in resource use. One must be able, and 
willing, to prescribe from this analysis. Prescription needs to be the 
ultimate aim, especially in view of the poverty of much of the world, in 
relation to underdeveloped economies. Yet this aim is often not recognized, 
and certainly not attained, in many important subjects affecting the 
efficiency of agricultural industries or the general well-being in so far as 
it is derived from the rural sector. In this respect the limitations of 
American agricultural economics, if only by virtue of its overwhelming 
absolute preponderance and of its influence in other countries, are an 
especial cause for concern. 
With this view in mind, two subjects will be considered as illustra-
tions - agricultural marketing, the writer's main past speciality, and land 
tenure and reform. The former will be considered mainly within the 
American context but the latter with direct reference to underdeveloped 
countries. In addition, one other subject, the study of which conveniently 
could be developed by agricultural economists, will be discussed. This 
subject is patterns of urban and rural settlement. 
Agricultural Marketing Structures 
Broadly speaking, research and teaching in agricultural marketing 
can be divided into two categories. In the first place, there are studies 
designed to make the system work more efficiently within its existing 
framework. Secondly, there are studies which consider whether or not the 
52 These possible additions and modifications do not include the "new" 
(Paretian) welfare economics. In the writer's opinion, this is a less 
effective guide to understanding the scope and limitations of welfare 
analysis, especially.in relation to actual political processes in demo-
cratic societies, than political science itself. Such works as G. 
Myrdal's The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory 
from which some pertinent quotations are cited in Appendix 3, are pre-
ferred to the literature of the "new" welfare economics. 
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general framework should be changed. Of course, this distinction is not 
clear-cut. For example, proposals aimed at reducing production cycles in 
United States agriculture might require some public intervention, for 
example a grain price stablizing agency, which would involve at least a 
minimal change in the marketing structure. But we can distinguish 
broadly between minimal changes in degree and changes in kind, such as 
occur if a privately-organized marketing organization is replaced by a 
government-controlled institution or as are involved by vertical integration. 
In the earlier days of agricultural economics, marketing studies 
which either explicitly or implicitly questioned the efficiency of existing 
structures figured quite prominently in research. W. H. Nicholls's 
Imperfect Competition within Agricultural Marketing Industries is a good 
illustration, as well as the sources on which he draws for much of his 
evidence, such as the Federal Trade Commission's investigations on the 
meat packers. There were various studies on inilk marketing. But, 
although there have been many important changes in the structure of agri-
cultural marketing in the United States, such as the "organized marketing" 
based on state legislation in California or, more generally, the various 
milkshed arrangements, academic research on matters of structural 
efficiency are today probably no more numerous than they were thirty 
years ago despite the much larger numbers of agricultural economists. 
On the other hand, studies designed to enable the existing structure 
to work more efficiently, particularly studies of demand and supply response 
and demand and supply projections, have grown very greatly in number. 
Anyone who has worked in the field of agricultural marketing policy and 
sought to give more attention to the efficiencies of alternative marketing 
structures owes a great debt to the sometimes direct, but more often 
indirect, evidence than can be drawn from this large body of research 
intended to make the existing system perform more adequately. 53 Yet, in 
acknowledging this debt, one may still wish that some of the investigators 
had applied the "old" welfare economics, or modified versions of it, more 
explicitly to structural problems. 
There have been very few major studies within such a framework. 
R. G. Bressler's City Milk Distribution is an outstanding exception, as is 
the study by T. K. Galbraith and R. H. Holton on Marketing Efficiency in 
Puerto Rico. 54 Apart from a few articles, there is very little more. There 
are, apparently, no or hardly any detailed published studies of the welfare 
effects of the many marketing orders and marketing agreements in use in 
parts of the United States despite the fact that these schemes were frequently 
53 This can be seen, as far as the writer is concerned, by observing the 
names which appear most frequently in the index of his book, Agri-
cultural Marketing Policies , Basil Blackwell, Oxford 19 59 
54 Harvard University Press, 1955 
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introduced as income-raising schemes at the time of severe agricultural 
depression and are now continued on alleged grounds of more general 
efficiency. Similarly, the milk shed agreements have not been thoroughly 
reappraised. Nor, for example, is there anywhere in the literature a 
detailed statement of the general welfare theory for or against public 
intervention, as has occurred in Philadelphia or as is planned in New York, 
to resite and redevelop fruit and vegetable urban marketing facilities. 
One special aspect of this limited coverage of the efficiencies of 
marketing structures is the almost complete absence in the American 
literature of serious academic studies of American marketing enterprises 
operating in underdeveloped countries, despite their importance at least in 
Latin America. The publications of the Stanford Food Research Institute 
contain much valuable information, 55 but the study by Galbraith and Holton, 
already mentioned, is perhaps the only one which deals at any length with 
this important subject. The American literature cannot provide material 
comparable to that associated with P. T. Bauer, especially his book 
West African Trade, or the other British studies of marketing activities of 
British and other exp'at'riate firms in underdeveloped countries. For example, 
the Un'ited Fruit Company has not been subject, either directly or indirectly, 
to detailed academic study or governmental inquiry in the way such firms as 
the United Africa Company have been. 
This difference is understandable. Britian had a direct colonial 
commitment which forced the government to take an active interest in 
matters closely relating to the expatriate marketing firms. The United 
States had not. The politically more sacrosanct position of private 
enterprise in the United States may have served to reinforce this difference 
in governmental attitudes. Certainly, much of the work in Britain of P. T. 
Bauer and others arose from direct commisSions from the (then) Colonial Office. 
Yet, whatever the explanation, the gap in American literature is a serious 
weakness when set against the United States' international commitments. 
These various observations are aU supported, either by commission 
or omission, in the recent report by Dr. Robert L. Clodius and Dr. William P. 
Mueller, "Market Structure Analysis and Research. n56 First, footnotes and 
bibliography of this report testify to the small amount of available literature. 
Next, there is an outstanding omission: no references to some of the important 
works on welfare economics, such as by Scitovsky, Meade and above all 
Pigou. Tliese works are the essential deductive complement to such valuable 
analysis as covered in studies Clodius and Mueller mention, for example, 
that of Joe S. Bain. This leaves the writer wondering whether these two 
authors are anxious to describe structures but hold a restricted view of 
what prescription should emerge from the description. Finally, their 
55 See, for example, footnote 18 
56 Journal_Q_f Farm Economics, August 1961 
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article has no references relating to American firms within the marketing 
systems of underdeveloped countries, although elsewhere Dr. Mueller 
has written about agricultural marketing in such countries. 57 
What is needed is a series of studies from which we could draw a 
clear set of principles underlining what should be the nature and extent of 
public intervention, if any, to improve the systems of marketing, both in 
the United States and in other parts of the world with which it has economic 
commitments. There would be three benefits from such investigations for 
the United States and for the West's relations with underdeveloped countries. 
(1) Studies of United States situations would prepare economists for dealing 
with some of the important problems in underdeveloped economies. (2) 
A part of the program would, of necessity, include an appraisal of inter-
national agricultural marketing industries such as those dealing in bananas 
or other tropical fruits. Such an appraisal would place us in a better 
position to assess the charges of exploitation frequently levelled at 
expatriate traders in underdeveloped countries. (3) Any studies would 
need to be conducted from an historical as well as an immediately current 
viewpoint. In this way we should be more able to see clearly to what 
extent previous inadequacies of marketing systems were inherent in such 
industries or were the consequence of the general unstable economic 
conditions of the past. 
We need a crash program of interpretation within the field of agri-
cultural marketing policies 1 both nationally and internationally, both 
with respect to the United States and with respect to underdeveloped 
countries. 
Land Tenure and Land Reform 
The need for teaching and research on the applied welfare economics 
of land tenure and land reform has already been considered to some extent 
in the section, "Do We Care?" (page_6_). If one believes that uni-
versities can exercise influence in such highly charged political situations 
as exist in ·underdeveloped 1 overpopulated countries (these often being ex-
colonial countfies), the past neglect of land questions stands out as a 
serious mistake. This seems clear from the general tone of the ideas 
and policies currently favored in many such countries. 
In his recent paper, Economic Theory and Agrarian Economics, 
Dr. N. Georgescu Ragen demonstrates that in an overpopulated country 
the marginal principles of profit maximization do not apply to the rural 
sector and that a form of organization must be adopted which will 
maximize the present and prospective output of the whole agricultural 
labor force. 58 A feudal system working efficiently will do exactly this. 
But I unfortunately I for a long time feudalism has generally not been 
efficient. It is now always unpopular. 
57 "Some Market Structure Considerations in Economic Development," 
Joumal...Q! Farm Economics, May 1959 
58 Oxford Economic Papers, February 1960 
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An ideal means of maximizing the current agricultural output in an 
overpopulated country, assuming no economies of scale, is provided by 
individual peasant holdings. But economies of scale, although not great, 
do exist to some extent in many underdeveloped countries and cannot be 
obtained within the small holdings given to peasants after a land reform 
scheme. The result is that in many agrarian reform schemes a distribution 
of land is usually quickly followed by schemes, often compulsory, for the 
cooperative association of new peasants in production and sometimes in 
marketing. One Indian economist has said recently, "The solution (of the 
agrarian problem) has to be found in an organization of the agrarian sector 
in large units of land and population, feudal in theory, modem in technology 
and oriented to a socialistic purpose. Because the basic production units 
would be large, it is inevitable that the relation between men and land 
would be much looser than the one implied in individual peasant holdings. "59 
The point to note here is that the quotation illustrates a tendency 
in many underdeveloped countries to see ·the solution to agrarian tenure 
problems in terms of a single solution instead of in terms of various 
complementary solutions. For example, the Indian Congress has recently 
passed a policy resolution reflecting this attitude. The Congress en-
visages a more humane and democratically controlled form of the Chinese 
commune with the central cooperative organization responsible for max-
imizing current production as far as possible and for utilizing surplns labor 
on capital works. But, it is still the commune approach. One may 
question the wisdom of a unique solution, especially in view of the heter-
ogeneous economic, social and geographical conditions in a country so 
large as India. More generally, one may ask whether there may not be 
a constructive place for the more enlightened and progressive private 
landlords. Remembering the pliill.ce which has been found for the minority 
of such landlords in the land reforms of southern Italy, one asks if it is 
economically sound to reject landlordism completely. Similarly, is it 
necessary to go from the one extreme of regarding the family farm as ideal 
in all circumstances to the other of rejecting it entirely as a basis for 
future policy? In some areas the economics of scale in production are 
unimportant and the external economics in marketing can be achieved by 
either cooperative or by private marketing institutions. One might 
remember the modest success which has been achieved in recent years in 
agricultures based on individual peasant holdings in various parts of 
Africa, even for crops which are well suited to plantation agriculture, 
such as coffee or cotton. 
59 Professor V. M. Dandekar in a lecture "Economic Theory and Agrarian 
Reform" at an international seminar on Paths to Economic Growth 
organized by the Congress of Cultural Freedom and the Gokhale Institute 
of Politics and Economics at Maharashtr9, :India,, January 1961. To be 
fair, Dr. Dandekar advocates large scale organization in part as a means 
of providing work on capital projects in periods of seasonal unemployment 
or underemployment. In the writer's opinion, this end could be attained 
without resort to such large scale production units and is, therefore, not 
considered further, so simplifying the argument. 
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'There is an important opportunity to indicate by research the wide 
range of complementary means for improving tenure systems so that they 
assure an increased measure of justice to the cultivator and bring greater 
economic efficiency to the national economy. 
Some Problems of Location 
Other important structural problems concern the optimum locations of 
populations in terms of sizes of and distance between urban and village 
communities, both in developed and underdeveloped countries. Many of 
the problems here have only a slight or indirect effect upon the rural 
economy and might, therefore, be thought to fall outside the activities of 
agricultural economists. But, agricultural economists frequently have a 
keener interest in problems of regional development and of patterns of 
settlement than other economists. They have developed most succes sful~y 
the practical use of programming techniques which will be required to 
clarify some of the important welfare implications of patterns of rural and 
urban settlement. 
Changes in the patterns of settlement can have important effects on 
the income base and well-being of rural communities, even if in the first 
instance the changes directly effect urban communities whose prosperity 
is dominantly based upon secondary and tertiary industries. For example, 
if it were thought desirable on economic grounds to decentralize population 
away from some of the congested conurbations, than some rural areas: and 
country towns would certainly benefit from the advent of new employment 
opportunities ahd of new population to sha·re the social overhead, costs. , 
Moreover, in some underdeveloped countries a substantial degree of disper-
sion into small and less geographically urban settlement's may yield ah im-
portant social product in terms of more rapid agricultural progress and". 
development of' cottage industries using underemployed rural labor. 
So far there has been a great deal of work done on the hierarchical 
structure of settlements so as to define the relationship, both in terms of size 
and in terms of distance from each other, between and among· urban and rural settle-
ments. Crystaller' s study of the hierarchical pattern of towns· and villages in 
southwest Germany is one of the pioneering classics. The same can be said 
of Losch's analysis of the Iowan plain, which showed that, broadly speaking, 
each town "dominated" four toWJI1s in the next rank of the hierarchy below it. 
The Pareto "law" of income distribution has been applied by s·everal in-
vestigators, originally by H. W. Singer.60 As in describing income 
60 Economic Journal, June 19 36. For the present writer's contribution see 
Bulletin of the Institute of Statistics, May-June 1954. More than 100 
cases are considered to show the broad applicability and relevance of 
the Pareto law to describe relationships between size of settlement and 
numbers of settlements above specified sizes. 
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distribution, the Pareto formulation has important deficiencies although 
it is often a valuable first approximation; various more complex relation-
ships have been derived to explain the size pattern of urban and rural 
settlements, many of these studies appearing in the last decade in 
Economic Progress and Cultural Change. 61 
Mathematical summary of the space and size relationships among 
rural and urban settlements could be one of the most powerful planning 
devices if the mathematical properties of the optimum structure from an 
income maximizing point of view could be indicated for any particular 
country or region. Unfortunately, the work which has been done so far 
is descriptive rather than prescriptive - a good example of a lack of interest 
in the "old" welfare economics. We can measure fairly accurately properties 
of the hierarchies which have existed in the past. For example, if the size 
characteristics of settlement hierarchies are described in terms of the 
Pareto law, then it is common to ,find, with the important exception of the 
United States and Canada, that before a country begins its industrial 
revolution the slope of the curve is between -1.4 and -1.65 - but that as 
industrialization occurs, apart from there being a general movement of 
population from villages and countryside generally into towns, the larger 
towns grow relatively to the others so that the slope falls to between 
-. 95 and -1. 20. Yet, we cannot be certain that the extent of the change 
is economically optimal from the point of view of maximizing national 
income. 
Indeed, if we look, for example, only superficially at the tax policies 
of national and local government and the pricing policies of important public 
services we can find many cogent reasons for believing that the degree of 
concentration of population in the largest conurbations is wasteful of 
economic resources. It is common for example, for the commuter transport 
systems in large conurbations to be heavily subsidized. Public utilities 
must ba priced on the basis of average cost although they are often forced 
to expand their services under conditions of increasing costs. 
While these important economic wastes are often lost sight of, it is 
clearly obvious that outlying rural areas, for example the mountainous 
areas of western Europe, are heavily subsidiz.ed in order to maintain 
population in them. But, detailed examination would probably show that 
there is a basic "law" at work in many countries, both developed and 
underdeveloped, today: namely, the "law" of the subsidization of the 
extremes ..Qy the middle. This means that both the very large urban-
conurbations, such as New York, London or some of the South American 
cities, and at the other extreme the scattered and often isolated rural 
61 The pioneer of these more complex relationships was R. Gibrat, Les 
Ne'galite's Economigues, Paris 1931 
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communities are subsidized at the expense of urban areas within a size 
range of, say, 25,000 to 500,000 population.62 
In underdeveloped countries the large cities, often growing without 
control, are important sources of waste. Although they have heavy under-
employment and often large unemployment, people still flock to them from 
the overpopulated rural areas because at least there is a better chance in 
these towns of finding employment than there is in the countryside. 
Inevitably, when manufacturing industries are established, this attractive 
power increases. Unfortunately the large underemployed or unemployed 
proletariates of the big cities located in underdeveloped countries become 
groups with great political bargaining power. Their interests cannot be 
ignored even though this frequently involves retarding economic growth. 
For example, heavy social expenditures are required to mitigate the un-
rest which accompanies poverty and insecurity, usually harder to bear 
in big cities than elsewhere. In contrast, smaller towns may avoid these 
social costs. Simply by being smaller and nearer to rural population they 
do not acquire such a proportionally large urban proletariate; or, even 
where they do acquire it, its dispersion among a larger number of towns 
makes it politically less dangerous and harmful to economic growth. 
Research, then, is needed to find out what is the appropriate urban 
hierarchy in any particular developed or underdeveloped country. When 
considering the underdeveloped country, the range of possible social costs 
of large settlements must be extended to include the growth-damaging 
political reactions which are likely to arise in the face of politieally power-
ful urban depressed groups. The programming techniques of agricultural 
economics and perhaps even the older budgeting techniques can do much to 
indicate the size properties of optimum urban hierarchies. But, as in 
many other matters, it will be necessary to make a qualitative appraisal 
of many important factors bearing on the social costs of certain types of 
urban settlement. 63 
The discussions of this section constitute a plea for an important 
change of emphasis of work within the land-grant institutions. But, 
before, exploring more fully what is involved, the urgency of much of • 
62 For some limited economic evidence to support this statement as far 
as the United Kingdom is concerned, see G. R. Allen, "The Geography 
of Liberty," The Unservile State, (editor, G. Watson) Allen and Unwin, 
1958 
63 Especially if the concepts of social product and social cost need to be 
defined more widely than in the conventional static settings and are 
required to take in the essentially dynamic notion of circulation 
causation as used, for example, in G. Myrdal' s, Rich Lands and Poor 
(title for British edition, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, 
Allen and Unwin, 1957) 
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the argument may 1 it is hoped 1 be underlined by drawing attention to what 
can best be described as the economics of anti-colonialism or 1 more 
appropriately 1 the economics of anti-ex-colonialism. 
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DIAGNOSING THE ECONOMICS OF ANTI-COLONIALISM 
Economic policies in rich as well as in poor countries frequently con-
flict with the interest of the people whom they are intended to benefit in 
consequence of being influenced by pressure groups, and, apart, by 
powerful emotions which work against a rational solution. For poor 
countries the damaging effects of such irrationalities involve a greater 
loss of welfare than they do in the rich countries. Dr. Myint, who is 
quoted more extensively later in this section, notes that "The under-
developed countries are too poor to enjoy the luxury of harboring their 
emotional resentments. " 
In consequence, one urgent task today is to recognize the effects of 
intense nationalism and anti-colonialism on public economic policies and 
on economic doctrine in underdeveloped countries and to separate them 
from the many, strictly reasonable grounds for disagreement on what 
economic policies should be adopted. This problem of separating emotion 
from reason applies as much, if not more, to the primary sectors and 
related industries as it does to other sectors and industries. The task 
is not easy, but it is one which a university, especially in its teaching 
role, is or should be better equipped to tackle than are other institutions 
or public enlightenment. 
Many illustrations can be found of anti-colonialism and xenophobia 
producing, in the writer's opinion, unsound and uncritically- accepted 
economic doctrines. For example, economically dualistic development 
seems to be regarded almost universally as a sign that western economic 
ideas as well as international trading in primary products contrive to 
retard growth in poorer countries. In some cases this may be true. But 
the fact seems to be overlooked that, given the importance of external 
economies obtained from a degree of geographically-compact economic 
development, the influence of natural transport facilities such as rivers, 
the localization of raw materials and the existence of many internal 
social and economic barriers to complete mobility of factors of production-
some dualism is inevitable in the process of growth in underdeveloped 
countries and should be taken as a sign of growth and not as a pointer to 
II exploitation • u64 
64 As a salutary reminder, the experience in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries of Britain, a relatively socially homogeneous country 
in which distances are small, is discus sed in Appendix 4. However, 
none of this defense of "inevitable" dualism means that the writer is 
satisfied with the present degree of geographical concentration of 
economic development in some underdeveloped countries, as the 
discussion of a few pages earlier shows. 
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Again, expatriate traders, especially if they are also money lenders 
are always a good target of attack - as they were in Europe in the Middle 
Ages. 65 The indigenous economic interests they damage can use xeno-
phobia as a means of retaliation. For example, the widely-accepted 
views concerning money lender-merchants will not always stand up to 
serious examination. 66 Again, the writer's direct contact with the prob-
lem of expatriate traders came during a study of the marketing and dis-
tribution of dried fish in Central and West Africa in 1959. During the in-
quiry a recurring theme was the alleged economic harm which the foreign 
traders did. Yet statistical investigation suggested that it was in retailing, 
in which the foreign traders were absent, and not in wholesaling, which 
they dominated, that the main wastes occurred. 67 
Perhaps the challenge facing analysts in the general context of the 
economics of anti-colonialism can be emphasized by an extensive quota-
tion from the work of Dr. H. Myint. 
"It may be argued that we have given too strict an interpre-
tation of the 'export-bias' doctrine which is merely meant to convey 
the general proposition that, whatever the exact cause, the nine-
teenth-century process of international trade has landed many 
underdeveloped countries with a large ratio of raw materials exports 
to their total national products, making it desirable to reduce their 
'vulnerability' to international economic fluctuations. But the 
trouble is that the 'export-bias' doctrine tends to suggest that the 
raw-materials export production of the underdeveloped countries has 
been artificially over-expanded, not merely in relation to their 
domestic sector, but absolutely. Given the strong feelings of 
economic nationalism and anti-colonialism in the underdeveloped 
countries, this can be a very mischievous doctrine strengthening the 
widespread belief that to go on producing raw materials for the ex-
port market is tantamount to preserving the 'colonial' pattern of 
trade. Thus already many underdeveloped countries are giving too 
little encouragement to their peasant export sectors by diverting 
too much of their capital and technical resources to industrial 
development projects, and are also crippling their mining and plan-
tation export sectors by actual or threatened nationalization and 
various restrictions and regulations. The effect is to reduce their 
foreign exchange earnings so urgently needed for their economic 
development. Of course, no competent critic of the nineteenth 
century pattern of international trade would ever suggest the drastic 
step of reducing exports absolutely; some would even concede the 
65 See Appendix 5 
66 See Barbara E. Ward, Cash or Credit Crops? An Examination Qi.. 
some Implications Qi.. Peasant Commercial Production with Special 
Reference to the Multiplicity of Traders and Middlemen, Economic 
DevelopmentandCulturalChange, Vol. VIII, No.2, Januaryl960 
67 G. R. Allen and J. Chaux, Some Aspects of the Marketing of Dried 
Fish in_Central and West Africa, F.A.O., 1961. A good (continued) 
55 
need for vigorous export drive policies. 1 (1 Cf. 1 for example I 
Gunnar Myrdall An International Economy 1 p. 2 7 4.) But having 
built up a pervasive feeling of hostility and suspicion against the 
'nineteenth-century' pattern of international trade 1 they are not in 
a position to ram home the obvious truths: (a) that 1 even on an 
optimistic estimate of the possibilities of international aid I the 
underdeveloped countries will have to pay for the larger part of the 
of the cost of their economic plans aiming either at a greater national 
self-sufficiency or at the export of manufactured goods; (b) that the 
necess.ary fot§!ign exchange fore these development plans can be earned 
by the underveloped countries at the present moment only by the 
export of raw materials (though not necessarily the same commodities 
for which they were supposed to have a differential advantage in the 
nineteenth century}; and (c) that therefore to pursue their develop-
ment plans successfully it is vitally important for them to carry 
out the 'export-drive' policies 1 which in their technical properties 
may not be very different from those of the colonial governments in 
the past. 2 (2 Colonial governments have frequently defended 
their export-drive policies as the means of taxing foreign trade to 
finance services needed for internal development. But because 
they were colonial governments their moti'ves were suspect. At first 
sight we might imagine that the new independent governments of the 
underdeveloped countries would be free from this disability. But 
unfortunately I given the atmosphere of intense nationalism and 
anti-colonialism I this is not true. In some cases the hands of the 
newly independent governments seem to be tied even more tightly 1 
and economic policies admited to be desirable are turned down as 
'politically impossible.' Here those economists who regard them-
selves as the critics of the classical theory and the nineteenth-
century pattern of international trade have a special responsibility. 
Instead of dealing tenderly with the 'understandable' emotional 
reactions which they have partly helped to create 1 they ought to be 
emphatic in pointing out the conflicts between rational considerations 
and 'understandable' mental attitudes. The underdeveloped countries 
are too poor to enjoy the luxury of harboring their emotional resent-
ments.) In trying to carry out their development plans on the foreign 
6 7 (footnote continued from page 54) 
example 1 discussed there I is provided by the recent Nigerian official 
Report of the Committee .Q!1 Aids to African Businessmen. This seems 
to have totally misunderstood the economic factors determining success-
ful organization in the important stock fish importing trade. In con-
sequence 1 it makes proposals for limiting the activities of foreign 
businesses by licensing I the likely result being to damage the economy 
in the short-run without providing any guarantee that in the long-run 
the indigenous businessmen will become equipped to do the task now 
completed by the expatriate traders. 
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exchange earnings from raw-materials export they would, of course 
still be 'vulnerable'; but this should be considered separately as 
a problem in short-term economic stability3 (3 Cf. the United 
Nations Report on Measures for International Economic Stability 
and Myrdal's comments on it, op cit., pp. 238...;53.) and not as a 
criticism of the nineteenth-century pattern of international trade in 
relation to the long-term development of the underdeveloped countries." 
H. Myint, "The 'Classical Theory' of International Trade and the 
Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Journal, June 1958, pp. 335-6. 
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THE NEED TO REVIVE WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THE 
STUDY OF THE AGRICULTURAL AND AGRARIAN SECTORS 
The previous two sections emphasize the need for much greater 
attention than is at present given to questions of the economic efficiency of 
various aspects of structural organizations relating to agricultural and rural 
areas, as in marketing, land tenure and urban-rural relationships. How 
should this be done? 
The writer's proposal will probably be surprising and regarded as at 
least old-fashioned, even if not positively ante-diluvian! Much greater· 
emphasis should be given, both by use and by teaching, to applying the 
so-called "old" or Pigovian welfare economics in agricultural economics as 
a system of analysis, although certainly not necessarily as a body of doctrine. 
This is a plea that we make use of the whole range of ideas in Part II of 
A. C. Pigou 's Economics of Welfare and in such principle derivatives as 
A. P. Lerner's Economics of Control, T. Scitovsky's Welfare and Competition 
and J. E. Meade's Trade and Welfare (Volume II, Part I). 
Older economists will claim, generally with justice, that this welfare 
economics is an integral part of their background and professional make-up. 
Even so, large numbers of them seem to have turned from it to other techniques 
which, while in many ways more precise, are frequently more restrictive in 
the range of analysis. Then, a variety of reasons have led to Pigovian 
welfare economics being, in the writer's opinion, mistakenly neglected as 
a technique of applied analysis in advanced postgraduate training of agri-
cultural economists in more recent years. A class taken in welfare eco-
nomics in a Ph.D .. course but not intensively applied later is an insufficient 
substitute. This neglect seems especially serious in underdeveloped 
countries. 
The consequences are serious, for without some general view of wel-
fare economics, the research worker or teacher runs the risk of concentrating 
excessively on the study of a part of a whole at the expense of· that whole. 
Here we have for example, probably one important reason why so little work 
has been done on the structure of agricultural marketing and why too much 
time has been spent in studies, often yielding low returns, of efficiency of 
small sectors within an uncriticized structure. 
It is not intended that the Pigovian welfare analysis should be applied 
without any modifications or qualifications; to do this would simply be to 
ignore many of the important advances and insights of recent years. That 
the approach intended is more flexible can best be shown by discussing 
some of the principal objections which will be raised even against using 
the "old" welfare economics at all. 
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(1) There are doctrinal implications in Pigovian welfare economics 
which may be misleading, especially for underdeveloped countries. The 
Economics of Welfare and its immediate derivatives take for granted that, 
or fail to examine whether, policies to promote the so-called "best alloca-
tion of resources" are complementary or competitive with those which 
maximize the rate of economic growth. There has been a strong bias in 
assuming that they are complementary. Yet, policies for a "best allocation" 
and for growth may often conflict. 
A classic recognition of this possible conflict is Joseph Schumpeter' s 
argument in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, especially in chapters 
6 to 8, that certain restraints on competition promote technical and economic 
progress in the individual firm and that to this extent perfect competition 
cannot be taken as a norm. Critics of imperfect competition situations, he 
says, pay too much attention to the position reached by the firm on its long-
run cost curve and insufficient attention to the factors determining the posi-
tion of the whole curve; the loss through excess capacity may be more than 
offset by the downward shift of the curve promoted by the very institutions 
or arrangements which cause the excess capacity. 
Again, taxes on agricultural output, as applied by various devices to 
some export crops in some underdeveloped countries, may lead to a current 
"misallocation of resources," but the proceeds, if widely used, may secure 
a more valuable higher rate of growth, including improvements in agri-
cultural technical efficiency, more than sufficient to offset before long the 
effects of the initial "misallocation." 
More generally, and as a brief summary, economic growth depends 
upon a series of stimuli, in part interdependent and in part independent of 
each other: the total leve.l of investment, and, in consequence, of con-
sumption; the patterns of investment and of consumption, and the quality 
of the people (which subsumes their level of know-how and their attitude 
toward both the gains and inconveniences of progress.) Only a miraculous 
harmony of economic interests would insure that there is no conflict between 
the individual policies most favorable for each of these stimulants con-
sidered in isolation. Certainly, static perfect competition is unlikely to 
provide a safe guide. 
Another doctrinal weakness is the implicit assumption that the eco-
nomic system contains no important discontinuities (i.e. , kinks in the 
demand or supply curves) and that, as long as the man-made barriers 
(frictions) to change are eliminated or overcome by special measures;. 
adjustment in a competitive system will automatically tend to take place 
from a less favorable situation to one which is optimal in terms of total 
factor use and development. After all, Alfred Marshall had said; "Natura 
non fa cit salt us" (Nature does not make a jump.) But, perhaps, after all it 
does, as many recent writers on economic growth suggest. 
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Yet, to reject the doctrine of the "old welfare economics" does not 
mean discarding its analytical technique no more than doubts about some of 
the policy recommendations of Keynes' General Theory has required a whole-
sale rejection of his methods of thinking. Instead, the model of the "ideal" 
economic system will vary from country to country, perhaps only rarely 
corresponding, even approximately, to the. original perfect competition norms. 
For example, monopoly marketing for export crops may provide the most 
effective means of taxing agriculture to finance growth. But, justification 
for such cases can be discussed in terms of the Pigovian concepts of social 
costs and social products. 
Yet, the concessions could not be overgenerous. Once the allocation 
of resources, or more precisely of capital, has been determined between the 
broad sectors of the economy, whether according to Pigovian or non-Pigovian 
doctrine, the "best allocation" rules may be a perfectly satisfactory guide 
for a particular sector in maximizing the return from the resources at its 
disposal, subject to whatever constraints are imposed by the inter-sectoral 
allocation. This view will certainly generally apply in agriculture and its 
associated marketing industries. 
In all, the "old" welfare economics can be maintained as a frame-
work of analysis leading to prescriptive conclusions without necessarily 
accepting implicit or explicit prescriptions inherent in earlier statements 
or applications of it. 
(2) As Myrdal has said, "The perpetual game of hide-and-seek in 
economics consists in concealing the norm in the concept. It is thus imper-
ative to elucidate not only the explicit principles but above all the valua-
tions tactily implied by the basic concepts. "68 Practitioners of the "old" 
welfare economics have not always heeded this advice, and their recommenda-
tions are shot full of value judgments. 69 Yet, except in making us more 
aware of the normative overtones of concepts such as "best allocation of 
resources,'' discussions surroUnding the "new"· welfare economics : 
do not appear to have provided . any practical advance 'from the 
position that the economist making policy recommendations should be 
aware of the emotive· content of many terms he uses, such as "imperfect 
competition," should state his value premises and should indicate who 
gains and who loses economic utility if his advice is followed. This 
position is perfectly compatible with using a welfare economics derived 
basically from Pigou. 
(3) Has not welfare economics been replaced, or is it not in the 
position of being replaced, by quantitatively more accurate and therefore 
68 See Appendix 3 
69 As is much of this report. Here, it is hoped, that the writer's value 
premises are clear and that they will command wide support 
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more useful programming techniques developed in recent years? On several 
counts the answer is no. The least substantial objection is that programming 
techniques, while they may often locate economic wastes more accurately 
and while they can certainly measure the extent of some economic wastes 
much more exactly, do not in themselves indicate the causes of inefficiency 
or means of achieving improvement. In such situations, at least in complex 
cases, the results of econometric analysis become one part of the data 
which must be fed into a more comprehensive scheme of welfare analysis. 
More important, many situations are too complex to be handled satisfactorily 
by programming techniques; then the more qualitative and more deductive 
methods' of welfare analysis must be used. Even where the theoretical 
complexity of particular problems are not insuperable, inadequate statistical 
information makes the "old" welfare economics a practically more reliable, 
even though imperfect, tool. This is especially the case in underdeveloped 
countries. 
Perhaps the most overwhelming objection remains. Programming 
techniques are designed to deal with questions of efficient allocation of 
resources within a specified, often assumed, set of institutions. They do 
not and cannot analyze the efficiency of alternative institutions. Yet, 
changes in institutions are frequently of critical importance in securing 
rapid economic development. Indeed, economic progress in underdeve'loped 
countries often depends as much, if not more, upon appropriate changes in 
institutions than upon resource allocation determined wisely in the light of 
quantitative relationships within the existing framework. Here the "old" 
welfare economics can come into its own, even if it has not always done so. 
Pigovian welfare economics provides the best starting point in developing 
a system of analysis which will embrace qualitative appraisal of institutions 
and forces which cannot be quantified. It is the link between the institu-
tionalists and econometricians. 7 0 
(4) Welfare economics relies on a static presentation of the inter-
working of economic forces and does not recognize that their interrelation-
ships develop through time, often in sequences which may vary one with 
another. Yet, does all this make welfare economics inappropriate for 
itemizing the details of policies required to achieved stated economic 
objectives in an essentially dynamic world? 
The following is admittedly an incomplete answer, but provides 
grounds for feeling intuitively that static analysis is generally adequate. 
70 In all the writer p.grees with a recent statement by Professor J, R. Hicks. 
"One is driven to the conclusion that linear programming and the price 
mechanism are rather close substitutes - both in the things they can do 
and those they cannot. But the fact that two thi~gs are close sub-
stitutes does not exclude the possibility that there may be a part for each 
to perform." (Economic Journal, December 1960, p. 695) 
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There are many outstanding illustrations, such as Keynes' General Theory 
and the whole body of Cambridge economics, which show by their achieve-
ments that under many conditions static analysis is a perfectly convenient 
short-cut in comprehending the forces at work in a dynamic situation, 
especially in indicating the important conditions which must be fulfilled if 
a given position is one of stable equilibrium or if a position of stable 
equilibrium is attainabil.e. 
At the micro-economic level, a good illustration is provided by the 
use of the cobweb theorem in analyzing production cycles in agriculture. 
A more accurate account of the time process of interplay between the vari-
able concerned and of the path to or from equilibrium can be given by 
sequence analysis, as for example in thework of Dr. Marc Nerlove. 71 But, 
whether or not a position of equilibrium will be achieved or maintained can 
be stated in static terms: estimates of the time, given an initial disturbance, 
in moving from one position of equilibrium to another, assuming [as ·.in 
normally the ·case) stable conditions,, ca.n be judged by· sirnple' 'obser'"" 
vation and interpretation of past experience and ·.does not depend 
upon the system of analysis used. 
The case for "old" welfare economics has largely been made in 
meeting the likely points of objection to its use; but there is one reason, 
fundamentally political, why The Economics of Welfare should be a major 
analytical starting point in agricultural economics. Earlier quotations from 
Miss Barbara Ward's book, India and the West, have stressed the principal 
difficulty which the West faces in its dealings with the uncommitted nations -
its apparent lack of interest, except for motives of self-preservation, in 
the economic fate of the underdeveloped parts of the world. The emphasis 
in these quotations is entirely right. In relation to the needs of under-
developed countries, the work of the economist must often be of secondary 
importance. The great problem is much less how to enable them to make 
better use of their resources than it is to get them more resources, either 
as g'ifts or loans, from the rich countries. 
However, the secondary contributions of economic analysis remain 
valuable. In such terms one. must recognize that western economists as a 
whole are not doing sufficient to meet the ideological gap to which J. K. 
Galbraith referred in another quotation cited earlier, either in respect to 
agriculture or to other industries. Outside the Keynesian framework, which 
anyway is largely relevant only to the rich countries, we have no clearly 
thought out and agreed upon body of economic principles for economic 
planning. We cannot present to the underdeveloped world a coherent analysis 
for working out the whole interplay of economic forces which will offset the 
71 The Dynamics of Supply: Estimations of Farmers' Response to Price, 
Johns Hqpkins Press,, 1958, pp. 55-59 
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intellectual attractions of the apparently successful, simple recipes of the 
communist countries. More precisely, we cannot provide the planning map 
for a decentralized society in terms which will be convincing or appropriate 
for an underdeveloped country; that is, for a society which, unless it gets 
more funds from abroad, must rely on forced savings, which must reform 
many of its institutions and which must eliminate many cramping frictions 
and barriers to economic change. We have no principles to indicate how far 
we should plan by the price mechanism and how far we need to supplement 
or replace its influences. 7 2 
Such a synthesis is urgently needed. Of course, part of the difficulty 
is that the small number of economists writing about underdeveloped countries 
disagree strongly among themselves concerning the nature of significant 
economic inter-relationships. 7 3 But, to a large extent, we might find that 
an effective synthesis of many apparently conflicting ideas would be fairly 
quickly attained simply if more economists concentrated on the problems of 
agriculture (and of other industries) in relation to economic development 
from the analytically comprehensive approach of Pigovian techniques. For 
example, application of the old welfare economics might do much to sort out 
the confusions in the doctrines which have come to be associated w:ifh anti-
colonialism. 
In all, Pigou' s Economics of Welfare remains the important starting 
point in building up a system of analysis which will take into account the 
inter-play of economic and social institutions as well as relationships be-
tween economic variables within specified institutional frameworks, in 
deciding how specified goals can best be attained. It provides the analytical 
framework within which econometric work can attain its full value. It also 
makes possible qualitative appraisals of institutions and forces which cannot 
be quantified. Although usually regarded as a weakness, one of the great 
72 In the first period of post-war Labor Party government in Great Britain, 
there was a lively controversy concerning the extent to which it was 
necessary to plan by means of physical controls and administrative order 
and of the extent to which reliance could be placed upon the price mecha'"-
hism. Two books, although both written very much with immediate British 
issues in mind, come close to indicating the type of synthesis required. 
They were James Meade's Planning and the Price Mechanism and Arthur 
Lewis' Principles...Q! Economic Planning. Both authors argued that a 
central planning agency could rely to a very large extent upon the price 
mechanism as long as it made certain crucial selective interventions. 
Both of the writers were known supporters of the Labor Party. Their books 
are both, in effect, extensions from A. P. Lerner's Economics Of Control, 
itself, except for its Keynesian elements, owing much to Pigou. 
7 3 Contrast, for example, the views of P. T. Bauer on the one hand with 
those of A. 0. Hirschman and G. Myrdal on the other. 
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strengths of the book, is the space devoted to lengthy and explicit discussion 
of the ways in which institutions operate on economic stimuli and responses 
to stimuli. 
It is strange that a thorough mastery of the long and difficult text 
books on linear programming should so widely be thought the sine~ non 
of many Ph. D. courses in agricultural economics, yet a mastery of the more 
comprehensive "old'' welfare economics is not required. We need many, 
very many, specialists in programming, but the need for a substantial, even 
if fewer, number of welfare economists may be even greater. As agricultural 
economists, we need to revive welfare economics. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONs 74 
Since their formation, the land-grant colleges, naturally enough, have 
concerned themselves principally with the technical, economic and social 
problems directly and immediately affecting American farmers. Essentially 
they have been, in the best sense of the term, national in outlook. But 
now the need, above all, is to look outward beyond the frontiers of the 
United States. This shift in outlook must be of much greater extent than 
that achieved by developments since the last war. As part of this task, 
colleges have to play a large part in the difficult task of rapidly building up 
a large informed and internationally-minded body of public opinion in the 
United States. The world in which we live demands a drastic reorientation. 
As it will have become clear many pages back, this report has been 
written to turn the premise above into a dominant conclusion. To this end, 
there have been three principal themes: 
(1) Certain topics demand greater emphasis in research and teaching 
than they now get: principally, (a) means of solving the American-European 
farm problem in ways which can directly and indirectly bring the greatest 
benefit to the poor countries of the world, and (b) important questions of 
structural efficiency relating to agriculture and the agrarian sector, again 
with main emphasis on the needs of underdeveloped countries. "Food for 
Peace, " land reform, marketing, and the patterns of urban I rural settle-
ment have been discussed at some length to support the urgency of the 
contentions. 
(2) Implicit in the analysis has been the writer's view that colleges 
need to reappraise the balance between teaching and advanced study on the 
one hand and highly specialized research on the other, with greater emphasis 
than is now given to teaching and advanced study. 
(3) More room should be found for the systematic use of welfare 
economics in postgraduate training and subsequent work. Greater opportunities 
should be provided for political scientists to work on agricultural and 
agrarian affairs. 
More specifically, the main recommendations are as follows. 
(1) Research or Advanced Study. Land-grant colleges tend to devote 
most of their resources in the social sciences to research on primary data, 
usually with reference to internal United States problems and frequently on 
narrowly-defined subjects. They do this rather than emphasize advanced 
7 4 Here it may be appropriate to remind the reader of the purpose of this report 
as indicated in the preface. Otherwise, the attitude underlying the recom-
mendations which follow may be totally misinterpreted as European sour 
grapes! 
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study I (appraisal and synthesis of secondary information 1 i.e. 1 research 
studies) with the object of getting a wider view of related problems and 
policies in the economic and social fields. 
In the long run 1 . advanced study, as defined, obviously presupposes 
a large amount of research, as defined. 75 Yet, in relation to the world's 
problems, especially those in underdeveloped countries, there is an 
immediate a.ndurgent need for a large number of university staff economists 
whose principal commitment should be, over the wide range of agricultural 
and agrarian policies, to assimilate a large body of secondary information, 
to synthesize from it, and to disseminate the results both on and off campus. 
Perhaps only five percent of resources within agricultural economics 
and related fields should be redirected to achieve the envisaged benefits. 
Yet this shift underscores a strong plea for more generalists and less 
specialists. 
(2) The Role and Status _Qj the Teacher. To create an academic 
climate suitable for generalists and to garner the fruits of their work pre-
supposes a reappraisal of the status of teaching, ~ se, in the land-grant 
colleges. Conversations with academic people in many colleges and the 
writer's own limited experience indicate that success in teaching is valued 
much less than success in research. "Publish or perish" is a reasonable 
rule if an individual's teaching commitment is to be within a narrow field. 
In that case stimulating teaching will generally presuppose successful and 
continued research on primary data. 
But if it is granted that there is a need for more generalists, then for 
them research on the one hand and teaching and advanced study on the 
other, at least if simultaneously pursued, become competitive and not 
complementary. 76 Working on primary data and writing up the results 
consume time ·and energy and mitigate against teaching in a successful, 
integrated way over a wide range of topics. There is an extremely important 
role to be played by the academic who is primarily a teacher with wide 
interests, who keeps most of his time for advanced study (as defined above) 
and who relies principally upon the spoken worti to disseminate his under-
standing. 
(3) Extension Work and Adult Education. In line with the last two 
recommendations there is an extremely strong case for strengthening the 
efforts already being made in several land-grant colleges (Arkansas, Iowa, 
Pennsylvania and New York) to widen the scope of extension work by pro-
viding basic material and guidance for farm community groups to discuss the 
75 Many British universities may err too much in the other direction, but the 
extent to which they have so far emphasized prowess in teaching prqvides 
7 6 a striking difference from what appears to be the situation in land -grant colleges. 
Perhaps the majority of needed generalists should be recruited from those 
who have already demonstrated, by a successful research career, an 
awareness of the dangers of superficiality - which is the risk of advanced 
wide-ranging study (and which maybe asserted against parts of this report!) 
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more general problems bearing on local and state government and administra-
tion. In the process, extension work becomes adult education in the social 
sciences. A. further need is to widen the terms of reference to take in the 
rest of the world and the United States' international policies. 
(4) Organization. The proposals made above generally do not involve 
any major changes~ in organization within the land-grant colleges which 
are unlikely to be self-evident, Presumably, the main problem would be in 
judging the teacher, whose attainments obviously must be less tangible 
than those of a researcher. 
One specific organizational proposal, it is hoped, would be favorably 
considered. Closer formal links should be established by the land-grant 
colleges with European universities having strong departments of agricultural 
economics. 7 7 Apart from the reciprocal benefits for Europe, this arrangement 
would aid the United States. European academic traditions could be of 
great assistance in securing the new emphasis suggested above. In addition, 
such contacts would facilitate the more extensive tapping of the large 
amounts of expertise on underdeveloped countries which, by virtue of past 
imperial connections, exist in many European countries, including their 
universities. This, of course, is a wasting asset, but it is still sub-
stantial. 7 8 
One specific way of fostering the proposed intercourse might be for 
inter-university agreements which would enable American postgraduate 
students to count work at European universities as part of their required 
course work for a Ph. D. at an American university. 79 Formal arrangement 
would be required because of the need for an American student seeking an 
academic career to possess a Ph. D. Or again, some projects how being 
planned bilaterally between individual American universities and 
7 7 This would be as much, if not more, to the benefit of Europe as it would 
be to the United States. Above all, American demonstration of the value 
of a high level of specialization would help to check the European 
tendency to produce too many generalists - a tendency which may explain 
why Europe, outside Holland and Scandinavia, lags in econometrics, 
but not in policy studies. 
78 On several occasions during 1960 and 1961 the writer was given the 
opportunity to sit in on discussions relating to new projects in under-
developed countries, especially in Africa, being planned by American 
universities. From time to time it seemed clear that, if the experience 
existing in Europe could be drawn on, given objectives could be attained 
more quickly. The academic labor market of the Atlantic Community is 
in many ways still an imperfect one! 
79 The Oxford postgraduate Bachelor of Philosophy (B. Phil), taken in 
Economics with an optional paper and an Optional dissertion in Agricultural 
Economics, and Diploma in Agricultural Economics are two examples. 
The Diplomas of the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague are others. 
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institutions in underdeveloped countries might be developed on a tri-
partite basis to include particular European universities as third partners. 
(5) Important Topics in Advanced Study and Research. In view of the 
considerable economic element in present international tensions, certain 
subjects claim top priority. In advanced study a crash program is needed, 
especially for underdeveloped countries, above all for land, credit and 
marketing problems. In research a top -p'riority is a thorough appraisal with-
in a realistic set of political assumptions of the case for a greatly extended 
"Food for Peace" program, especially one which covers the whole Atlantic 
Community. In the longer run, the welfare economics of urban and rural 
geographic patterns of development seems important. 
(6) Political Science in the Study of Agricultural and Agrarian Mfairs. 
The need today is for a political economy, rather than an economics, of 
agriculture and rural communities. To this end there should be much more 
scope for work by political scientists in the social studies work of the 
land-grant colleges, and they should work closely with economists. 
Taken together these six proposals would involve some radical 
changes in the field of social studies in the land-grant colleges. Perhaps, 
we can end as we began, stressing the urgency of the international situa-
tion which demands at least a willingness to consider drastic proposals. 
"We are in a revolutionary era, and there is no rule saying that 
Communist leaders· rhay not play Communist politics in it - or that 
only capitalists counterrevolutionary politics may be played. 
"For the irrepressible human forces which are impelling this 
great transition period there are no simple solutions. The crying 
need is for understanding and explaining them so that they may be 
lived with and adjusted to. The world which our foreign policy has 
been concerned with salvaging has already largely gone by. Our 
basic challenge is to become able to make human welfare our dominant 
concern. And the shift had better be made rapidly, because only in 
that direction lies what is worthy of striving for. 
"But that way demands a crash program in intellectual and popular 
rationality! " 80 
SO Neal D. Houghton, Professor of Government, University of Arizona, 
"The Challenge to Intellectual Leadership in Recent American Foreign 
Policy," Social Science, Vol. 36, No. 3. June 1961 
69 
APPENDIX 1: Agricultural Production of Western Europe, 1909-13 to 1934-38 
Stagnation and Growth in the European. Economy by Ingvar Scennilsonl 
contains statistics (presented as index numbers) by regions for the whole of 
Europe, including the Balkans, of gross production for three principal groups 
of commodities - seven major crops (wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, pota-
toes, and sugar beets), pigs and cattle (including milk cows.) The indexes 
for the six regions, which now roughly correspond to Western Europe, have 
been recombined according to the proportionate productions of the crops or 
numbers of stock ~mmediately before World War I, as shown in Table 1. 
Total output is underestimated by these indexes in that the productivity 
of the cattle and pig populations probably rose slightly more rapidly than 
their numbers, due to improving techniques in animal husbandry. On the other 
hand and much more important, some bf the increase in stock, especially 
pigs, was ,sustained by part of the production of the seven crops included 
in the index and by increased imports of feeding stuffs, imports being 
especially significant for Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Thus, on balance, the recombined total index of the next paragraph some-
what overestimates both gross and net output. 
In the years immediately before World War II, on the basis of Table 
20 in Output and Expenses. in Agriculture in Some European Countries, 2 
perhaps 7 5 percent of the net output of Western European agriculture cam~ 
from the three groups of products here considered. A breakdown shows 
cereals (ex:cluding those used for feeds), potatoes and sugar beets, 20 
percent; cattle products including milk, 40 percent; and pigs, 15 percent. 
Combining the three indexes according to these percentages as an approxi-
mate measure of the total supply of home-produced farm commodities gives 
the following results: pre-1914- 100, late 1920's- 102, 1934-1938- 113. 
For the complete period, say 1913-1936, this is equivalent to a compound 
rate of growth of approximately 0. 5 percent, or approximately 0. 6 percent 
if the war years are ignored. For the last decade alone, the growth rate 
is about l. 2 percent per annum, but this was a period of greatly increased 
use of imported feeds for livestock. 
Even if developments in the sectors not covered by the analysis were 
markedly more favorable, and this is not likely, the over-all rate of growth 
of output (either gross or net) could not be increased appreciably. Then 
there is the already noted bias towards overestimating output. In all, the 
output of Western European agriculture during the inter-war period in-
creased at the most by . 7 5 percent annually, and probably at a lower rate. 
l Economic Commission for Europe.i Geneva, 1954 
2 ECE/FAO, Geneva, 1953 
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There is scattered independent support for this conclusion. In the 
United Kingdom, gross and net outputs were hardly changed in real terms 
for the period 1924-39. Real gross output was 3. 5 percent higher for 1934-39 
than for 1924-29. Real net output (after deducting all purchased imports) 
was 3. 0 percent higher. 3 Estimates for France indicate an increase in 
total output of less than 1 percent per annum from 1896 to 1936, with a slow-
ing down in the rate of growth after 1913. 4 Output grew more rapidly in 
Sweden, but from 1896-1905 to 1930-1939 averaged . 87 percent annually 
with probably a slight increase towards the end of the period. 5 Denmark 
is one of the few European countries which maintained a high rate of growth 
in the inter-war period, the annual increase in output being aboo t 2 percent. 
Finally, another investigation, by P. Lamartine Yates, offers the 
"guestimate" of a compound rate of increase in total production of . 8 per-
cent from 1909-1913 to 1953-1958, a figure which is raised by the rapid 
expansion since World War II. 6 
3 Ojala, E. M. , Agriculture and Economic Progress, Oxford University 
Press, 1952 Appendix Tables XIX and XX 
4 Svennilson, I., on, cit., p, 101 5 ~ --Ibid. I p. 251 
6 Food, Land and Manpower in Western Europe. Macmillan, 1960, pp. 214-215 
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APPENDIX 2: Food for Peace 
Prospects for Surpluses 
The most convenient way to begin consideration of the limitations of 
agricultural policies in the rich countries is to consider what the situations 
of demand and supply for farm products will be up to 197 5 in the West as a 
whole, assuming, for the sake of analysis, that farm policies will be main-
tained in their general objectives broadly as they were in the late 1950's. 
This means ignoring, for the time being, recent developments in United 
States agricultural policy, especially the Emergency Food Grain Program of 
1961 and the measures envisaged for later years under the diluted Omnibus 
Farm Bill, which became law in July 1961. Similar analytical assumptions 
are implted for other western countries, particularly that supply controls 
will not be extended and that the government will make strong efforts to 
maintain the current relations between real farm and non-farm incomes in 
Europe. Canada and Australasia should be included in the anlaysis. 7 But 
this discussion will be limited mainly to the United States and Western 
Europe without reducing the wider validity of the arguments. 
(1) United States 
Given the working assumptions, the basis for projecting the demand 
for United States farm products in 1965 and 1975 is provided by the evidence 
submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, especially that 
by Rex. F. Daly and Raymond A. !ones, and by the subsequent work of James 
T. Bonnen 1 which embodies his evidence to the committee. 8 
Rapid population growth in the United States provides a strong impetus 
to demand. Since the more conservative of the periodic sets of estimates 
provided by the Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce have been 
continually falsified by events in recent years 1 it is best to use the upper 
limits of available projections. Accordingly, population is likely to increase 
from the base year, 1956, by 17 percent in 1965 to reach 196 millions and by 
40 percent in 1975 to reach 235 millions. 
Following Daly, real incomes per head can be taken to rise from 1956 
by 16 percent to 1965 and by 40 percent in 197 5. These increases in real 
incomes are likely to have but small effect on the quantities of food consumed 
7 As should Argentina in view of its importance as a supplier of grains, even 
though it is politically outside the Western 9ommunity. 
8 See Policy for Commercial Agriculture: Its Relation to Economic Growth 
and Stability, 85th Congress, First Session (Washington D.C. 1957) and 
Charlton F. Christian (editor) Adjustments in Agriculture - A National 
Basebook, (Iowa State University Press 1961), pp. 125-151. 
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as distinct from expenditure on related services for the well known reason 
that the income elasticity of demand for quantities of food in the United 
States is probably between 0.15 and 0. 20. By 1975 per capita consumption 
of food may increase by between 6. 0 and 8. 0 percent on the base year, 
1956.9 
The combined results of the postulated increases in population and in 
real per capita incomes, assuming re·al prices for food fairly close on average 
to those ruling in 1956, give probable increases in the domestic requirement 
for agricultural products as food or raw materials of not more than 20 percent 
from 1956 to 1965 and of not more than 52 percent from 1956 to 1975. Then, 
9 Daly's forecast rests on the assumption that the two decades from 1956 
would almost repeat the annual rates of general economic advance from 
1925-29 to 1951-55. In the eleven years, 1950-60, per capita disposable 
personal incomes rqse 18 percent, but mainly in the first six years; the 
total increase in 1956-60 was only 5 percent less than 1 percent per annum. 
In the future, growth may improve on recent achievements; it has undoubted-
ly been checked to some extent in recent years by anti-inflationary policies. 
One's view of future prospects depends on the extent to which one regards 
the problem now as being due to structural. unemployment rather than to 
general deficiency of demand. The severe unemployment which persists 
when the American economy has pulled out of recession, becoming pro-
portionately more significant from one boom to the next, is not amenable 
to the established Keynesian prescriptions. It is no longer confined to 
some relatively isolated mining areas in the Appalachians. Unskilled 
labor generally seems to be becoming technologically unemployed as 
machines become more and more a cheaper substitute for it. 
It is among the lowest paid one-fifth of the United States population that 
food consumption would rise most for a given percentage increase in in-
come. Yet it is among this group that the smallest rise in purchasing 
power is to be expected even if real incomes for other groups rise rapidly. 
(Some compensation may come, however, from increased use of food stamps 
among the unemployed.) 
Another uncertainty in the situation is growing concern in the United States 
over the effect on personal appearance and health of "over-eating." 
Already on this account the consumption of a few individual foods appears 
to have been appreciably checked. The current interest in total calorie 
intake could possibly provide a more powerful over-all limiting influence. 
Neither of these arguments provide grounds for modifying greatly the fore-
casts given above, but they do provide additional reasons for regarding 
these as upper, rather than lower, limits to future increases in the demand 
for food stuffs. 
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allowance has to be made for the contracting export market for United States 
farm production. Also for the expectation that the demand for imported trop-
ical foods will rise much more rapidly than the demand for homegrown supplies. 10 
In all, as compared with 1956, the demand for domestic agricultural 
production at constant real prices is likely to be higher by some 12 percent 
in 1965 and by some 36 percent in 1975, an approximate annual increase of 
l. 1 per cent for the 10 and 20-year periods. ll For the decade 1966-7 5 these 
projections represent an average annual increase of 2. 1 percent lower in the 
earlier years and higher in the later years. 
10 Exports of United States agricultural products are assumed in this part of 
Daly's analysis to be in 1965 and 1975 at the 1951-55 levels, the years 
before large subsidies were used to boost exports. Exports of agricultural 
products in 1951-55 were by value 70 percent.of those in 1956. Although 
extremely rough and ready, these suggested levels of future agricultural 
exports will probably be closer to experience than those projected in the 
study by A. Ioanes. 
In two respects Ioanes' projections (Policy for Commercial Agriculture, 
pp. 119-126) seem to set the export market opportunities too high. They 
have perhaps been insufficiently pessimistic for wheat and almost 
certainly too optimistic concerning the opportunities for feed grains, 
especially in Western Europe. Ioanes projected that dollar sales of 
feed grains, principally in Western Europe, would more than double by 
1965 from the base of 1951-55 and 1956-57 and that by 1975 they will be 
almost three times as large. Recent estimates up to 1965 by FAO are much 
less optimistic, emphasizing Western Europe's ability to produce feed· 
grains and noting that net import into the European Economic Community 
may even decline. 
In any case, it should be remembered that United States agricultural 
exports are equivalent in value to about one-tenth of United States 
agricultural production and that, therefore, errors in forecasts here can be 
more easily tolerated than in other parts of the analysis. 
11 Daly provides alternative forecasts of export home demand for American 
farm products on the basic assumption that substantial reductions in 
prices occur for cotton, wheat and major feed crops to bring them into 
competitive positions in the traditional export markets and that there will 
be some subsequent reductions in cattle and pig prices. These price 
reductions are as follows: cotton, 2 0 percent; wheat, 3 7 percent; corn, 
30 percent; soybeans, 21 percent; cattle, 4 percent; and hogs, 9 percent. 
The detail projections for exports market are taken from the Ioanes study. 
Total farm output required would be higher than in 1956 by 16 percent in 
1965 and 40 percent in 197 5 respectively, increases of 1. 6 percent and 
2. 0 percent per annum for the 10 and 20 year periods. 
The political assumptions underlying this forecast are, to say the least, 
heroic. 
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Supply projections are much more difficult, even given the political 
assumptions temporarily made for the sake of analysis. This is because of 
the nature of the current technological revolution in agriculture. With 
allowance made for changes in the value of money and for temporary effects 
of the weather, the value of sales during the period 1910~60 from the 'farm 
sector to the rest of the United States economy and as exports doubled although 
the qdditional factors of production required during these years to secure the 
increase rose by less than one quarter .12 
This remarkpble increase in total production and in productivity did not 
follow a smooth pattern. There were two periods when progress was extremely 
rapid. During the years 1938-46 total output increased by more than three 
percent per annum, although the progress made during this period had been 
held back to some extent by the Great Depression of the 1930's and would 
have occurred earlier if farming had been more prosperous in the late 1920's 
and in the 1930's. The 1950's witnessed an annual average percentage 
increase in output of slightly under two percent, achieved with hardly any 
rise, if at all, in the level of total inputs. 
Broadly speaking, these are the periods of the two revolutions in 
United States agriculture - the first mainly a revolution of the engineers 
and the second largely and increasingly a revolution of the scientists. 
Scientific improvements in, for example, seed has been going on, of course, 
for a long time and engineering improvements are still being applied in 
American agriculture. But, in general, the rapid growth in the productive 
capacity of United States agriculture in the earlier period was due to the 
great and economically-produced mechanical power which replaced human and 
animal effort. The achievements of the last decade have been principally 
those of the agronomist, biologist, botanist, etc. 
The problem is to assess the future implications of this second revolu-
tion. Occasionally, agricultural economists strike a note of caution. 13 
12 This conclusion, and the next paragraph, are based on the finding of 
t 
Ralph A. Loomis and Glen T. Barton in Productivity of Agriculture in~ 
United States, 187 0-195 8. (United States Department of Agriculture, 
Technical Bulletin No. 12 3 8 . ) 
13 R. G. Bressler in "Farm Technology and the Race with Population, " Journal 
ofFarmEconomics, Vol. XXIX, No.4, Nov. 1957, pp. 849-864, suggests 
that, bearing in mind that about 40 percent of the total increase in output 
from United States agriculture between 1935 and 1955 was due to virtually 
once-for-all effects such as replacing the horse by tbe tractor or exceptional 
weather effects, the technological challenges imposed by growing United 
States population may be much greater than is generally recognized. 
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Yet, the general concensus seems to be that the technological revolution shows 
no signs of exhausting itself, especially when account is taken of the accumu-
lated know-how which remains to be fully employed within United States 
agriculture. 14 
The growth of total output in the last decade can be summarized as 
follows as an index: 1947-49 = 100; 1950-52 = 104; 1953-54 = 109; 
1955-57 = 114; 1958-60 = 126 (provisional) .15 The last three years of the 
decade experienced extremely favorable weather in the Corn Belt and the 
Grain Sorghum Belt which in part accounts for the sharp rise in the index for 
these years. 16 In all, allowing for special effects of the weather, output 
during the last decade has increased annually by about two percent. The 
best working assumption is that this rate of increase will be maintained for 
at least the next decade. 
(2) Western Europe 
The picture for Western Europe is much less clear, partly because of 
the economic heterogeneity and political disunity of the region, partly because 
of the radical changes in the economic resilence of the Continental countries 
since 1945 in comparison with 1919-39, and also because of the lack of 
appropriate statistical and econometrical studies. 17 
14 The Paley Committee asked the question of a large number of agricultural 
scientists, "By how much could agricultural production increase, assuming 
that all known techniques were applied throughout American agriculture?" 
The weighted average of the answers came out at an 86 percent increase. 
These answers were in all probability based upon technical criteria which 
took no account of cost and profit conditions; even so, allowance for 
these economic factors would undoubtedly have left a large opportunity for 
increased production. 
15 Agricultural Statistics 1960, United States Department of Agriculture, 
Table 662 
16 In a recent but as yet unpublished study, Dr. Louis M. Thompson of 
Iowa State University estimates that some 10 percent more feed grains 
were produced in the United States in 1958-60 than would have been the 
case given average weather conditions, the difference being approximately 
the amount added to the feed grain surpluses. 
17 Efforts are being made throughout Western Europe to fill the gaps in the 
information. Since preparing this report, a detailed British study has 
been completed: G. C. Clark, G. R. Allen and G. T. Jones, Expected 
Level of Demand, Supply and Imports of Farm Products in the United 
Kingdom in 1965 and 1975, Oxford University Institute for Research in 
Agricultural Economics, 1961. (Inquiries should be directed to Mr. Jones, 
the principal author.) 
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The base for an analysis is provided by a recent FAO report, Trends in 
European Agriculture and Their Implications for Other Regions. 18 The FAO 
projections go only as far forward as 1965, but it seems reasonable to infer 
likely developments for a few more years from the results. Its conclusions 
in respect to supply can be supported by other scattered data, although 
various qualitative considerations give grounds for believing that even more 
rapid progress is economically possible and more likely than FAO envisages. 
The FAO demand projections are based on alternative sets of assumptions 
concerning per capita income changes and are broken down into three groups 
of countries - the European Economic Community of France, Germany, Italy 
and Benelux; the Mediterranean countries of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey 
and Yugoslavia; and the remainder comprising Scandinavia, Austria, Ireland, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The details are shown in Table 2 .(pagezgj. 
The wide ranges of possible income changes shown there are necessary in 
view of the great uncertainty about the probable future rates of economic 
growth. The tripartite regional division is partly to recognize the political 
entity of the European Economic Community and partly, except that Southern 
Italy is included with the rest of Italy in the European Economic Community 
group, to distinguish the low-income southern region from the more prosperous 
remainder. 
Population is growing less rapidly in Western Europe than in the United 
States. Real incomes per head in most parts of the region are likely to grow 
much more quickly, even though the high rates of growth of the 1950's partly 
reflecting the making good of war damage, will almost certainly not be repeat-
ed, especially if the United Kingdom and Sweden continue to expand as slowly 
as in the last few years. The upper limit of the projected per capita income 
for Western Europe as a whole is set at an annual increase of 3. 5 percent in 
contrast with the 4. 6 percent experienced from 1950-58. Even so, this 
assumes a rate of growth outside the European Economic Community and 
Mediterranean countries appreciably higher than was attained in earlier 
years when conditions for growth were more favorable. Current developments 
in the principal country concerned, United Kingdom, are not encouraging. 
Of course, the rates of growth in the European Economic Community and in 
the Mediterranean countries might exceed the upper limits suggested for 
them in Table 2, but this is unlikely. The over-all upper limit to the fore-
casted rate of growth of real income is probably slightly optimistic. 
The effects of rising incomes on food consumption need much more 
precise handling than for the United States. The lower levels from which 
Western Europe starts means that the demand for food will initially be much 
more responsive to income changes, but that the extent of the response will 
fall appreciably and perhaps rapidly as standards of living rise. The FAO 
study allows for the importance of curvilinear relationships between real 
income and food consumption by basing its projections on Louis Goreux' 
detailed studies of European demand for food summari~ed in Table 3 (page J!QJ. 
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In principle, the FAO methods of analysis may appear incompatible 
with the working political assumptions on which this study is based. Levels 
of consumption rather than levels of demand are forecasted. In the first 
stage of the analysis, demand is projected assuming no change in real prices 
to consumers; similarly, production is projected assuming no change in agri-
cultural policies and relative prices of farm products. These forecasts have 
often implied lack of balance between demand and supply at the forecasted 
date, so that the second stage of the analysis has consisted in reconciling 
the demand and production projections through assumed price adjustments 
and changes in agricultural policies, taking into account the export and 
import prospects.l9 Thus allowance has been made for such changes in 
relative prices which might be made to switch resources from products with 
more limited markets to those with greater opportunities and for resulting 
effects on levels of consumption, given the elasticities of demand. 
For example, in the case of milk products in the European Community, 
production is likely to increase more rapidly than demand. Milk surpluses 
would be transferred into butter and substantial exportable supplies from the 
Community should become available by 1965. In view of the limited scope 
for butter exports from the Community to the London market, the major world 
market for exports, it is considered that part of the butter surpluses would 
have to be consumed within the Community and that to achieve this increase 
in domestic consumption would require a price reduction. 20 Thus, under 
the low income · assumption of Table 3, it is considered that butter demand 
would increase by 17 percent at constant prices, but that in view of the 
large expected increase in milk production, 20 percent, the price of butter 
will generally decline and consequently the consumption of butter might in-
crease by 22 percent instead of the originally-suggested 17 percent. For 
liquid milk, it is not necessary to allow for the price effect of an attempt to 
clear increased supplies from the market because the price elasticity of 
demand for fluid milk is extremely low in countries ·which have or are likely 
to have milk surpluses. For cheese, the demand is slightly price elastic 
and some allowance has been made for a slight price effect on the demand for 
cheese. 
At the opposite end of the economic spectrum, production of beef in 
the Mediterranean countries is expected to increase at a lower rate than 
demand, especially if incomes rise at the higher rate postulated. Beef 
supplies are limited and most of the low-income Mediterranean countries 
would be unwilling to spend much foreign exchange on imported beef. So, it 
has been assumed that consumption would remain below the projected demand 
at constant prices and that equilibrium would be obtained through an increase 
in beef prices. For Western Europe as a whole, in view of the likely milk 
l9 See Trends in European Agrfculture, p. l and 9. The more detailed illustra-
tions of the next two paragraphs are based on correspondence with Mr. 
Louis Goreux. 
20 If Britain joins the European Economic Community, this assumption will, 
in effect, hold even more strongly. Britain will no longer be a "dumping 
ground" for Continental supplies. 
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surpluses and the relative scarcity of beef, governments will stimulate 
beef production at the expense of milk as much as possible. 21 
Yet these adjustments do not greatly flout the political assumptions 
made earlier, namely that farm policies would be maintained in their 
general principles as they were in the late 1950's • .l'he higher price and 
income elasticities of demand at the farm gate in Western Europe, as 
compared with the United States, and the much greater degree of diversifica-
tion on individual farms and within regions in Western Europe mean that 
greater changes in relative prices for farm products and in the commodity 
terms of trade of agriculture are compatible with our underlying assumptions 
about future policies. · Moreover, although the FAO investigators have made 
no specific assumptions concerning income parity between farm and non-
farm groups, it seems unlikely that the general fall in farm prices implicit 
in the FAO adjustment are great and that, allowing for improvements in farm 
efficiency, they do not imply an appreciable fall in farm incomes. In so 
far as the adjustments are incompatible with our underlying assumptions, 
the FAO inquiries somewhat overstate, but only slightly, the likely increased 
European demand for farm products. Although the product mix is changed 
somewhat, the projections of aggregate demand and supply are unlike'ly to 
differ greatly from those which would have been derived if the second stage 
of the FAO analysis had not been carried out. 
In general, given the broad continuation of current policies, the de-
mand for farm products at the farm gate in the three groups of European 
countries will have probably increased at most from 1956 to 1965 by 27 per-
cent in the Mediterranean countries, by 18 percent in the European Economic 
Community and by 13 percent in the remaining countries, giving an increase 
of 18 percent for the whole of Western Europe. These represent annual 
compound rates of growth of respectively 2. 7 percent, 1. 9 percent, 1. 4 
percent and 1. 9 percent. These rates are, of course, averages for the 
period. For, say, the years 1965 to 1970, if population and per capita 
income continue: to increase as before, the annual expansion of demand for 
food will be somewhat lower. 
Past and prospective changes in the supply position of Western Europe's 
agriculture cannot be examined in the same degree of statistical detail as 
were those for the United States, especially for the period before World War II. 
The sources of changes cannot be so accurately identified, and care must 
be especially taken to allow for the changing degree of reliance on imports 
as a source of animal feed. 
21 It also seems likely, although FAO has made no allowanpe for this, that 
production of feed grains at the expense of good quality wheat will in 
some cases be encouraged and will serve as a further stimulus of meat 
supplies, especially beef. 
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Between 1919-39 the performance of agriculture in the various Western 
European countries differed greatly, one with another. At the one extreme, 
total agricultural production in France perhaps fell; in Germany, Benelux 
and Switzerland it rose very slightly; only Scandinavia, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent Italy, achieved any appreciable 
increases. 
In all, the total agricultural production of Western Europe probably 
increased by no more than . 7 5 percent annually from immediately before 
World War I to the end of the 1930's ... and perhaps by much less. The 
basis of these conclusions are some extremely approximate calculations, 
given in Appendix 1, which can be summarized indexwise as follows: 
pre-1914 = 100, late 1920's= 102, 1934-38 = 113. For the whole period, 
this is equivalent to a compound rate of growth of approximately 0. 5 percent 
annually, or of approximately 0. 6 percent annually if the war years are 
ignored. In the 1930's the annual rate of growth was about 1. 2 percent, but 
this was a period of greatly increased use of imported feed for livestock, 
especially in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom - a period 
of intensified use of existing techniques much more than a period of changes 
in techniques. The productive power of Western Europe's resources within 
agriculture increased less rapidly, even though at a greater rate than in the 
1920's. 
Since 1945 agricultural production has grown more rapidly. There 
was an exceptional spurt from 1948 to 1953 when the ravages of war were 
being overcome. But for the period from 1934-38 to 1956-58 as a whole, 
agricultural output (excluding both home grown and imported animal feeds) 
has increased at about l. 4 percent compounded annually. In the last three 
years of the 1950's the average annual increase was greater than that for the 
rest of the decade, but, in possible contrast to the experience of the United 
States, this improvement was not due in any significant degree to exceptionally 
good weather conditions. 
The main results for the last 50 years are summarized in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
Average Annual Rates of Growth in Agricultural Output in 
Western Europe, 1909-13 to 1956-58 
1909-13 to 
1934-38 
Crops (including animal feeds and seeds) 
Livestock products 
Agricultural output (excluding homegrown . 7 5 
and imported animal feeds) (maximum) 
1948-52 to 
1953-55 
3. l 
4.9 
3.9 
l$53-55 to 
1956-58 
0.9 
2.5 
1.4 
Sources: See Appendix l and FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 1959, 
Tables II- 3 and II -4. 
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The technological revolution in agriculture has come generally much 
later in Western Europe than in North America. There is some limited in-
formation suggesting that both in Sweden and in the United Kingdom in the 
late 1930's new techniques were being adopted more quick! y than before and 
were producing a marked rise in the rate of growth of productivity. 22 But 
generally, the overall technical changes in Europe before World War II were 
extremely small in comparison with those in the United States. Only the 
United Kingdom had achieved, for example, any· marked replacement of the 
horse by the tractor. 
But 20 years later this picture of a technically stagnant agriculture 
would no longer apply. In 1939 there were 200,000 tractors in Western 
Europe, in 194"8 there were 850,000 and in 1957 there were 2, 300,000, not 
counting horticultural tractors and motorized cultivators. In ·the same period 
the tonnage of artificial fertilizers used had more than doubled. European 
statistics of farm populations are sufficiently reliable only in the north-
western countries to give a reasonably accurate measure of the change in 
the numbers of people dependent on agriculture. There a farm population 
decline of 20 percent has occurred in the last decade. But in most other 
areas, even where the agricultural population has not fallen absolutely, it 
is now a much smaller proportion of the total population. Dr. Mordecai 
Ezekiel, until recently in charge of the Economics Division of FAO, could 
say with justice in August 1960: "Since World War II, especially in the 
1950 decade, European agriculture has gone through a veritable technical 
revolution, with yields per acre increasting more in one decade than in the 
previous three or four, almost half the horses replaced by tractors and a 
rapid reduction in farm population. "2 3 
FAO now predicts agricultural output in Western Europe to rise by 
something over 20 percent by 1965 on the base period 1955-57. That is at 
2 percent per annum. This expectation, broken down into groups of countries, 
becomes about 3 0 percent for the Mediterranean region, 2;-() percent for the 
European Economic Community and 15 percent for the remaining countries, 
mostly in the northwest, giving annual compound percentage rates of growth 
of respectively 3. 0, 2. 0, and 1. 6. 24 
22 Colin Clark, World Supply and Requirements of Farm Products, Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society (London, 1954), Series A (Gereral), Vol. 117 
Part III, pp. 263-296 
2 3 Mordecai Ezekiel, "Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on 
Developed Economics and Foreign Competitors: The International Per-
spective;' Journal of Farm Economics, December 1960, p. 1064. 
24 Op. cit., Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, FAO 
November 1960, p. 2. To a slight extent some of the regional differences 
are due to the adjustments made during the FAO calculations to bring 
demand and supply more into balance, anticipating likely modifications 
of existing agricultural policies, as discus sed earlier. 
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These may well prove conservative estimates. In addition to the land 
yet to be released by replacing animal work stock by the internal combustion 
engine, an extremely important onc.e for--all source of inc rea sed agricultural 
output in Western Europe is provided by the opportunities for consolidating 
scattered pieces of land in fragmented farms into compact holdings even 
though, as is the case with the work stock, the gain might take many years 
to be realized completely. 
Throughout Western Europe consolidation programs depend on the 
majority support of farmers in individual communes, and so far progress has 
been limited. But the startling benefits to productivity where consolidation 
has taken place are getting to be widely known. Already in Germany, and 
probably in certain parts of France, the demand for consolidation is over-
taxing the supply of the professional staff required to carry it out. This may 
soon be the situation elsewhere. 
In all, taking into account the rapid migration from the land and the 
increasing opportunities in the towns 1 the necessary exchanges of plots 
among farmers, either by private individual negotiations or through official 
schemes, may occur fairly rapidly and, subject to the avqilability of technical 
staff, at an accelerating pace. This being so, it should be remembered that 
consolidation of scattered plots of land represents perhaps the most productive 
investment in Western European agriculture today. 
It is not always easytoctistinguish the true net gains due to consolida-
tion from the other factors associated with it. There is a large release of 
labor from unproductive walking from plot to plot, as well as economies in 
the use of capital equipment. Better techniques become possible once 
consolidation occurs, but they often require new and more costly forms of 
capital. In any case, the:y ·are adopted. An informed guess suggests that, 
for an extremely small outlay on technical and legal expenses of consolidation, 
typical increases in net output may lie between 20 and 30 percent. Certainly, 
and this is our main concern here, gross output is likely to increase by such 
amounts. 25 
Migration from the land has probably not yet resulted in any appreciable 
rise in average standards of farm management. Apart from a few cases such 
as Sweden and apart from the United Kingdom, movement out of agriculture has 
not yet. gone far enough to reduce the number of farms greatly, except in 
some of the more mountainous and less productive areas. But if Western 
Europe remains generally prosperous, the next decade will almost certainly 
witness a dramatic reduction in the number of farms, full time as well as 
part time, as in the United States during the last 20 years. On average, 
25 This is based on the writer's discussions a few years ago with agricultural 
engineers working on, or informed about, the consolidation schemes in 
France. Detailed studies are urgently needed. 
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the less efficient farmers are likely to leave particular districts. With larger 
farms the average standard of management should improve 1 even assuming no 
individual improvements in the technical standards of those who remain 1 be-
cause outside the Low Countries, northeast France and certain parts of the 
United Kingdom I the technical competence of individual farmers varies 
greatly within particular districts. 
But, of course, there will be great improvements in technical standards 
of individual farmers 0 The most significant point in any appraisal of likely 
production prospects in Western Europe is that the two agricultural revolutions 
which can be distinguished in the United States during the last 30 years are 
occurring simultaneously in Europe, namely the revolutions of the engineers 
and of the scientists. And for once Europe has the advantage of the late 
start I able to employ immediately the most profitable of the technologies 
accumulated over a long period in the United States and in the few technically 
progressive areas of its own 0 One example is provided by the dramatic 
increase in grain yields obtained in many areas recently; another is the 
developing broiler industry 0 
One factor promoting these changes is the pressure on farm incomes. 
While most I if not all, Western European governments are genuinely trying to 
support farm incomes, the inescapable pressure of supply on demand has 
squeezed farm incomes 0 The fall in price of farm products and pressure on 
farm profits is forcing farmers to find unused technical opportunities in an 
attempt to avoid declining net farm incomes. As in the United States, some 
farmers are forced to adopt more productive technologies when previously 
they have preferred the more leisurely practice of maintaini'ng existing 
techniques which had been adequately profitable before prices fell. For 
example, in the last few years British producers on the smaller farms have 
reacted to falling egg 6 pig and milk prices by intensifying their efforts except in 
so far as they have been able to take the opportunity provided by changes 
in relative prices to shift to other products, especially beef cattle. Further I 
such is the paradox of the situation today in Europe that, in trying to develop 
selective programs of aid to smaller farms, many countries are using methods 
which will speed the increase in output. 26 
26 In the agriculture which rely heavily upon imported feed grains, such as 
in Britain 6 Holland and Denmark 1 a selective reduction in egg, meat and 
milk prices may be associated with a reduction in supply without releasing 
resources for other uses on farms. Even in these cases, the changes in 
supply will probably be small unless discriminatory pricing schemes 6 as 
envisaged in the governmental proposals in March 1961 to limit milk 
production in Britain, are introduced whereby the price for marginal supplies 
from the individual producer are markedly below the average price offered 
him. (Incidentally, in November 19 61 a referendum among British milk 
producers failed to produce the required majority in favor of supply control.) 
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Bearing in mind these considerations, the annual compound rate of 
increase of supply of agricultural products for the whole of Western Europe 
could easily be nearer to 3 percent than to the 2 percent suggested by FAO, 
the Mediterranean countries and the European Economic Community contribut-
ing most. It could last at least until 1970 and perhaps until 1975, barring 
quantitative restrictions on output.27 
(3) The Balance of Demand and Supply 
The forecasts made earlier are no more than informed guesses which 
could easily be falsified by events. Rates of population growth in a period 
of 15 or 2 0 years can change greatly, as they have in the past. This is 
especially relevant for the longer term projection of demand for the United 
States. Per capita real income projections could be wide of the mark 
although, if so, this would not be important for the United States where the 
income elasticity of demand for food and fiber at the farm gate is already 
extremely low. In Western Europe, income elasticities of demand for farm 
products are still sufficiently high for the margins of error in estimating 
them to constitute an important source of inaccuracy in the forecast - in 
either an upward or downward direction. But, the greatest uncertainties are 
found inassess'ingthe impact on agricultural supplies of the rapidly accumu~ 
lating technological information both in the United States and Western 
Europe. 
However, the analysis has contained important elements of caution 
as far as any tendency to forecast surpluses is concerned. A minor point 
is that the United States projections overestimate, rather than underestimate, 
the likely growth of per capita real income. Much more important are two 
features of the European analysis. First, the high income assumptions 
have been used to insure that the future demand for farm products at the 
farm gate is set too high rather than too low. Second, the analysis is 
presented so as to show the likely demand-supply positions even if the 
supply of farm products increases by only 2 percent annually; given the 
maintenance of existing policies, it is likely to grow at a much higher rate, 
perhaps reaching 3 percent annually. 
The main results of the foregoihg' analysis are presented in Table 5 on 
page ..aa_. Even noting the considerations just stated, these results show 
that, taking the United States and Western Europe togefher, ·surpluses are 
likely to increase during· the 1960 •s and that they will remain large for many 
years more. More specifically, barring restrictions on production, United 
States surpluses are·likely to grow during the 1960's, .although at the end 
of the decade supply may be expanding no more rapidly than demand: in the 
27 See P. Lamartine Yates, Food, Land and Manpower in Western Europe, 
Macmillan Co., 1960, pp. 215-6 for a view much nearer that of the writer 
than that of FAO. 
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TABLE 5 
Summary of Forecasts of Annual Percentage Growth of Demand and of S1,1pply 
for Farm Products in the United States and in Western Europe I960-1975, 
Assuming No Important Changes from Agricultural Policies in Use in Late 
1950's 
United States 
1960-1965: Demand, l. 1; supply, 2. 0 
1965-1975: Demand, 2.1 (lower in the earlier and higher in the later years); 
supply, 2. 0 in the early years; thereafter no forecast made. 
Western Europe 
1960-1965: Demand, 1. 9; supply at least 2. 0 and perhaps as high as 3. 0. 
These total projections can be broken down by groups of countries 
as follows: 
Mediterranean countries: Demand 2. 7; supply at least 3. 0 and 
perhaps as high as 4. 0 
European Economic Community: Demand, 1. 9; supply at least 
2. 0 and perhaps as high as 3. 0 
Other countries (including Scandinavia and the United Kingdom): 
Demand 1. 4; supply, 1. 6 and perhaps higher, say 2. 1. 
1965-1910: All over the region, demand likely to grow appreciably less 
rapidly than in 1960-1965, while supply likely to grow as before. 
1970-1975: All over the region, demand to grow probably even less rapidly 
than in 1965-1970, while supply likely to maintain previous rate 
of advance. 
early 1970's there is a real possibility that demand may be outpacing supply. 
In Western Europe during the next few years, there will probably be a slight 
tendency to add to the existing small surpluses but, again assuming no major 
changes in farm policies and no restriction on production, the imbalance will 
be much more serious towards the end of the decade. This situation is likely 
to continue during the first half of the 1970's. 
In all, the West faces problems of large and accumulating agricultural 
surpluses for at least another 10 years. In the United States, the main prob-
lem will continue to be the principal price-supported cropsrgrains 
and cotton, and tobacco. In Western Europe grain surpluses may be minimized 
by reducing imports, and the problems of excess production will be relatively 
more important for milk and certain milk products, pork, poultry and eggs. 
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The foregoing prognostications are intended simply to give a focus. 
Clearly 1 the underlying assumption that farm policies will remain unchanged 
from what they were in the late 1950's is unrealistic and has only analytical 
validity. The next step is to explore the alternative changes in policy which 
might be undertaken to depl with the surplus problem I taking into account the 
important political constraints on the freedom of action of the governments of 
the United States and in Western Europe·. 
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APPENDIX 3: Some Extracts from G. Myrdal, The Political Element in 
the Development of Economic Th;;;y2s -
"By operating with definitions which purport to be universally valid, 
people have often succeeded in making an implied political principle appear 
logically 'correct'. Psychologically, it is the other way around. The emotive 
force which is rationalized in the implied principle makes the normative 
element that has been disguised in the definition appear to be absolute and 
'correct'. The perpetual game of hide-and-seek in economics consists in 
concealing the norm in the concept. It is thus imperative to eradicate not 
only the explicit principles but above all the valuation tacitly implied by the 
basic concepts. Being concealed, they are more insidious and more elusive, 
and hence more likely to breed confusion." .... p. 192. 
"It should be one of the main tasks of applied economics to examine 
and to unravel the complex interplay of interests, as they sometimes converge, 
sometimes conflict. This ought to be done by economists because the in,_ 
tricacies of the price system are such that interests often run along different 
lines from those suggested by a superficial examination. It would be of great 
practical importance to reconstruct precisely the social field of interests. In 
the first place, we should want to know where interests converge, for in these 
cases we could make at once generally valid recommendations. We should 
also want to ascertain where lines of interest intersect. In these cases we 
could offer alternative solutions, each one corresponding to some special 
interest. Both types of solution can claim objectivity, not because they 
express objective political norms, but because they follow from explicitly 
stated value premises which correspond to real interests. The solutions are 
of practical interest to the extent to which their value premises are relevant 
to political controversies, i.e. in so far as they represent the interests of 
sufficiently powerful social groups." .... p .. 198. 
"Under the pressure of socialist and institutionalist criticism, there 
began a retreat from the conservative interpretation of the doctrine of harmony. 
Laissez-faire was no longer considered to be in the interest of society under 
all circumstances. It was thought that there was room for improvement 1 
particularly with respect to income and property distribution. Nevertheless 1 
the conviction persisted that such reforms and the resulting social order are 
in the interest of society as a whole. Harmony of interests was no longer 
thought to apply to the status quo but to a social order which had to be brought 
about. J. S. Mill introduced this revolutionary tendency into classical welfare 
theory. It is equally metaphysical because it rests on trn belief that the jdeal 
order can, in principle, be determined and that, if this has not been done yet 1 
it is merely due to imperfect knowledge. The idea that one can judge social 
policy from a 'purely economic point of view' is thoroughly metaphysical. It 
assumes tacitly that there is such a thing as the interest of society as 
whole, and that particular interests, though superficially antagonistic, are 
28 Routledge and·Kegan Paul, Broadway House, London, 1961 (3rd impression.) 
(Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press. ' 
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at heart reconcilable. The same tacit assumption confined the discussion 
of practical problems to those general 'principles' whose role we have tried 
to illustrate above." ..... pp. 194-195. 
" ..... interests may run along quite different lines. All institutional 
factors which determine the structure of the market, indeed the whole economic 
system including its tax and social legislation, can be changed, if those 
interested in the change have enough political power. Very different interest 
constellations would be relevant in this wider setting. Moreover, the situa-
tion will look different according to whether we examine short-term or long-
term considerations. 
"An inquiry into economic interests should therefore treat the whole 
institutional set-up as a variable. It should also examine to what extent 
any groups are sufficiently powerful to bring about institutional changes, 
and it should finally trace the repercussions of various possible institutional 
changes throughout the price system." ..... pp. 196, 197. 
"To sum up: Economists are on safe ground as long as they describe 
actual events and their causal connections, and as long as they examine the 
effects of certain clearly defined 'interventions' under specified conditions. 
In order to make economics into a practical technique or technology, we 
should have to analyze in detail the field of economic interests. The main 
obstacle to such an analysis is the fact that the institutional set-up is not 
given but is changeable in various directions and to various degrees. We 
must, moreover, know the distribution of power amongst social groups in 
order to estimate what institutional changes are feasible. 
"The technology of economics should reflect possible strategies in a 
'war game'. It would be of practical importance if it throws light on the 
possible course of future developments and probable trends. It could also 
be used to clarify the relation between various programmes and the interests 
of the groups which sponsor them. 
"Certain policies may thus be seen to be ill-conceived or doomed to 
failure from the start. In this way political intentions could be clarified and 
orientated. Such a study of the politics of economics could claim to be 
objective, just because it makes no recommendations save those which follow 
some specified, clearly expressed interest. For the same reason, it could 
not yield absolutely valid conclusions in the sense of postulates of an 
economically correct conduct as such, except, possibly, in the limited 
sphere where interests can be shown to be identical. 
"Such an economic technology is in the best tradition of political 
economy, which has always aimed at social policy. It would have to become 
more relativistic, i.e. it would have to be related to explicit and concrete 
value premises. If this science of economic politics, after thus having been 
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made conditional and relativistic 1 is to have any practical significance 1 
the chosen value premises must express the interests of all the strong social 
groups. This requires an analysis of the field of social interests. But the 
crucial problem is to discover those interests 1 while taking account of all 
the institutional changes which are feasible under political pres sure. " 
pp. 1981 199. 
"A technology of economics should not accept attitudes which are 
based upon erroneous conceptions of the real world. Ideally I it would have 
to build on attitudes which are individuals with false opinions 1 given their 
general emotional dispositions would have 1 if they knew all the facts; or 1 
to make the condition more sensible I if they knew all that is actually known 
by contemporary experts. We are thus faced with the task of inferring from 
observed actual attitudes those potential attitudes which various groups 
would take up in potential situations on the unrealistic assumption that 
they had a clearer understanding of economic phenomena." ... p. 202. 
"Economics as a science is not concerned with the political problem 
of moulding attitudes. It cannot pronounce on questions of value. The 
technology of economics must take certain attitudes as given and cannot lay 
down what they ought to be. It can 1 however I help to keep the politic a~ 
struggle more honest. In so far as the public pay any attentiont.oitl it may 
prevent their attitudes from being based on false notions about the facts 
and particularly about the relations between economic interests. A situation 
in which intellectual sanitation of this kind would be even more important 
than today may arise if the state I or powerful groups which control sufficient 
material resources and have command over the necessary techniques I should 
want to use the propaganda machine in order to pervert public opinion. " 
.... p. 206. 
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APPENDIX 4: Inevitable Dualism 
Since there are many factors preventing completely perfect mobility 
of labor, economic dualism is often an unavoidable consequence of rapid 
growth and, in a sense, is a healthy symptom that development has re-
placed stagnation rather than a cause for concern. 
Miss E. Gilboy provides interesting information in her book Wages in 
Eighteenth Century England, (Harvard University Press, 1934) which can be 
used to show that England, during the early stages of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, experienced economic dualism. She analyzes the course of money 
and real wages in three parts of the country - the region around London, 
the west country, and the northern counties where most of the early indus-
trialization occurred. She summarizes her admittedly approximate results 
by making the following estimate of the course of annual money wages in the 
three areas (p. 220), showing elsewhere that the relative changes cannot be 
accounted for by regional changes in retail prices. 
London the West the North 
1700 25- 0-0 17-10-0 11- 5-0 
1725 27-10-0 17-10-0 13-15-0 
1750 30- 0-0 17-10-0 15- 0-0 
1775 30- 0-0 18-15-0 22-10-0 
1790 30- 0-0 20- 0-0 26- 5-0 
Her general conclusions are as follows: "In three very dissimilar 
districts, the course of the workers' daily wages in terms of money and 
estimates of real wages have been presented. No general tendency common 
to the three regions has been discovered. Not only the movement, but the 
levels of wages, differed. This fact is all the more important, as it was 
found that the regional divergences of the price of grain, used as the measure 
of real wages, were not marked. The course of wages, then, was little or 
not at all related to the movements of living costs. 29 In three of the most 
important sections of England the situation of the laboring population was 
highly diverse. The lot of the northern laborer became continually more 
favorable 1 that of the western laborer worse. The London working man more 
than managed to hold his own." (pp. 219 and 225.) 
This dualism in the British economy continued well into the middle 
of the nineteenth century, at least until the coming of railways made the 
labor market much less geographically imperfect. 
British experience is not typical. There are many instances to show 
that some dualism is in practice inevitable in a growing economy I even 
where market forces are doirig a satisfactory job in promoting development. 
29 Adam Smith observed that wages were entirely unrelated to the price of 
corn, particularly over a short period. Wealth of Nations, Everyman ed. , 
p. 66. vol. I. 
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APPENDIX 5: Hostility to Foreign Merchants and Traders in 
Underdeveloped Countries. 
The hostility to foreign merchants and traders seems to be a common 
and continually recurring features as one compares the early economic 
development of various underdeveloped countries. This note considers 
foreign merchants and traders in England during the later Middle Ages; it is 
based directly upon W. J. Ashley's An Introduction to English Economic 
History and Theory, Part I, Chapter 2, Sections 13 and 14, from which the 
quotations are taken, and upon Part 2, Chapter I. 
By the end of the twelfth century there was a thriving trade between 
England and continental Europe, with continental merchants and traders 
operating in the country in, relatively speaking, large numbers, They 
were not . . . unwelcome. But they were regarded with constant suspicion, 
lest they should succeed in what, of course, they were ever attempting, 
viz., in breaking down the monopoly of the English merchants themselves 
in the internal trade. Hence, we find them subjected to a stringent code of 
regulation, drawn up and enforced by the municipal authorities. They had 
to buy their goods only of "burgesses. " They were obliged to sell only to 
"burgesses, " and then only on market days, i.e. in full publicity. They 
could: not venture into retail trade. They could not go inland with their 
goods. To insure their not going beyond the limits marked out for them, 
another regulation forbade them from remaining in the country inore than 
forty days. 
The Magna Charta {1215) nominally provided for much greater freedom 
of trade within England for foreign merchan~s. However, English merchants 
were able effectively to maintain their exclusive rights for a long time, 
although both the king and the great nobles had vested interest in encouraging 
foreign merchants who would bid up the prices of what they had to sell from 
their estates and bid down the prices of imported luxuries. Gradually various 
concessions were made to foreign merchants and traders. But it was not 
until 1303 that Edward I was able to make a strong attack on the monopolistic 
privileges of the indigenous London merchants. Then, "in return for the 
payment of additional customs, he abolished all the previous limitations as 
to the time and place of residence, and as to the persons to whom goods 
might be sold. " Significantly enough, the monopolistic position of indigenous 
traders in retailing was virtually confirmed. 
Even so, there was continual struggle between the king and the 
indigenous London merchants and traders for about 50 years before the 
decisions of 1303 became really effective. Even then, the story is not 
ended, especially outside Lonqon, as can be seen in Part 2, Chapter I of 
Ashley's book. 
98 
It is worth noting that this hostility to 11 foreigners .. existed between 
the merchants and traders of English towns. The negotiations between various 
towns for freer and reciprocal trading rights would read, one suspects, very 
much like recent negotiations at GATT. 
In the end one of the most effective forces breaking down the monopoly 
of the indigenous London merchants and traders in the internal trade seems to 
have been the compactly ... organized and, therefore, politically-effective 
Hanseatic League. 
Economic xenophobia is not a product of twentieth century unrest 
alone, 11 Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose. 11 
